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ABSTRACT 
Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 21, Critical Infrastructure Security and 
Resilience, directs a whole-of-government approach to strengthening the security and 
resilience of critical infrastructure against physical and cyber threats. Per policy, critical 
infrastructure is categorized into 16 sectors. Security and resiliency efforts against cyber 
threats are constrained by this sector-based approach. This thesis assesses the sector-
based approach by the following criteria: expertise or a notable advantage of the sector-
specific agency; promotion of cybersecurity measures by the critical infrastructure 
community partnership structure; and legislation, policy, or sector-specific 
characteristics that enhance security and resilience of the sector. These 
assessments gauged the adequacy of organizational structures that lead and 
support critical infrastructure cybersecurity. 
Exemplar cyber attacks against critical infrastructure and response actions are 
described in order to demonstrate strengths and limitations of the sector-based approach. 
This examination reveals that the U.S. approach to critical infrastructure is well 
conceived and executed in general. A number of significant vulnerabilities do remain in 
some sectors, however, as a result of incomplete or insufficient implementation. 
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A. OVERVIEW AND MOTIVATION 
The U.S. government has established 16 sectors of critical infrastructure that are 
essential to the functioning of the nation. As stated in Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 
21, Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, “It is the policy of the United States to 
strengthen the security and resilience of its critical infrastructure against both physical and 
cyber threats” [1]. PPD-21 defines critical infrastructure, outlines why government needs 
to focus its resources on protecting each sector, and establishes roles and responsibilities 
for various government entities.  
PPD-21 assigns the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the lead agency 
for protection of critical infrastructure, and as the entity with primacy of the assigned task 
DHS is required to “provide strategic guidance, promote a national unity of effort, and 
coordinate the overall Federal effort to promote the security and resilience of the Nation’s 
critical infrastructure” [1]. The sector-based approach to critical infrastructure constrains 
efforts to implement cybersecurity measures.  
To date, however, the overall efficacy of the sector-based approach as prescribed 
by PPD-21 has not been fully assessed and there is no qualitative measure of the efficacy 
of the sector-based approach. Example cyber attacks against U.S. critical structure are 
examined in the context of PPD-21 in order to assess the organizational response to cyber 
incidents. 
With PPD-21 as a starting point, this research examines U.S. policies and 
organizations that pertain to the cyber aspects of critical infrastructure security and 
resilience in order to gauge whether or not critical infrastructure sectors are appropriately 
aligned to carry out the task. When examining the cyber aspects of critical infrastructure, 
U.S. policies and organizations, and incident response actions, PPD-41, United States 
Cyber Incident Coordination, was an additional starting point. PPD-41 provides an initial 
alignment of U.S. government organizations with roles and responsibilities identified, for 
response and follow-on actions to a cyber incident [2].  
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B. CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE OVERVIEW 
PPD-21 and PPD-41 provide definitions and terms that are carried forward in 
subsequent policy documents and that are used by U.S. government agencies with critical 
infrastructure protection roles and responsibilities. These policy directives provide 
descriptions of what is classified as critical infrastructure, what is meant by security and 
resilience, and what qualifies as a cyber incident in the context of U.S. government policy.   
In particular, PPD-21 identifies 16 critical infrastructure sectors “whose assets, 
systems, and networks, whether physical or virtual, are considered so vital to the United 
States that their incapacitation or destruction would have a debilitating effect on security, 
national economic security, national public health or safety, or any combination  
thereof” [1]. These assets, systems, and networks span the nation physically and encompass 
significant portions of the economy and infrastructure. Further, these sectors are not 
necessarily discrete and are often interconnected or interdependent. Each critical 
infrastructure sector is assigned a corresponding sector-specific agency with primary 
responsibility for implementation of PPD-21 requirements for that sector.  
A sector-specific agency is a federal agency or department assigned roles and 
responsibilities for a sector of critical infrastructure. Assignment is typically based on a 
combination of preexisting statutory or regulatory authorities and presumed knowledge and 
expertise of the respective sector and its characteristics. The roles and responsibilities of 
the sector-specific agencies include acting as the primary interface between DHS, other 
federal entities, and the owners and operators of the respective sector’s critical 
infrastructure; leading day-to-day efforts with federal involvement; executing incident 
management responsibilities; and providing general support to the sectors.  
The sector-specific agencies are broadly responsible for ensuring resilience of their 
respective sectors, while owners and operators of critical infrastructure are primarily 
responsible for security. Resilience is defined as “the ability to prepare for and adapt to 
changing conditions and withstand and recover rapidly from disruptions [including] the 
ability to withstand and recover from deliberate attacks, accidents, or naturally occurring 
threats or incidents” [1]. Security, on the other hand, is defined as “reducing the risk to 
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critical infrastructure by physical means or defense cyber measures to intrusions, attacks, 
or the effects of natural or manmade disasters” [1]. 
PPD-41 describes a cyber incident as an event or vulnerability that affects the 
confidentiality, integrity, or availability of information of an information system, and goes 
further in defining a significant cyber incident as an incident that is “likely to result in 
demonstrable harm to the national security interests, foreign relations, or economy of the 
United States or to the public confidence, civil liberties, or public health and safety of the 
American people” [2]. Drawing from this definition, it is reasonable to generalize that 
cyber attacks against critical infrastructure have the potential to escalate into significant 
cyber incidents.  
PPD-21 and PPD-41 provide explicit and implicit tasking. These directives also lay 
out coordination efforts, reporting requirements, and basic strategies. The entities used for 
incident response, as defined in PPD-41, align with those identified in PPD-21. 
C. ORDERS, TASKS, AND ROLES & RESPONSIBILITIES 
The following strategic PPD-21 imperatives dictate the federal effort to strengthen 
the security and resilience of critical infrastructure [1]:  
Refine and clarify functional relationships across the Federal Government 
to advance the national unity of effort to strengthen critical infrastructure 
security and resilience;   
Enable effective information exchange by identifying baseline data and 
systems requirements for the Federal Government; and   
Implement an integration and analysis function to inform planning and 
operations decisions regarding critical infrastructure.  
In the context of cyber incidents, these imperatives are subsumed by three 
concurrent lines of effort defined in PPD-41 for government response to a cyber incident: 
threat response, asset response, and intelligence support and related activities. An 
additional line of effort is required if a federal agency is affected by the cyber incident; 
specifically, mitigation of the effects to the agency.  
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Threat response activities are efforts to identify cyber attack perpetrators and bring 
them to justice. These activities are led by the Department of Justice (DoJ) through the 
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task 
Force (NCIJTF). The FBI is designated the lead agency to direct the NCIJTF and any law 
enforcement activities. Threat response includes countering malicious cyber activity and 
conducting criminal investigations. Other components of threat response include 
attribution, pursuit, and disruption of malicious cyber activity and actors [2]. 
Asset response activities are focused on recovery from the cyber incident and future 
mitigation efforts. The National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center 
(NCCIC), an entity of DHS, leads asset response activities. The NCCIC is one of two 
centers operated by DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA). 
Asset response involves protection activities such as mitigation of vulnerabilities during 
malicious cyber activity. Restoration of services, lessening impact, and assessing risk to 
other assets are additional asset response actions taken in reaction to malicious cyber 
activity [2].  
Intelligence support and related activities support both response efforts by 
providing relevant information. The Office of the Director of National Intelligence, Cyber 
Threat Intelligence Integration Center (CTIIC) leads this line of effort. CTIIC uses a top-
down approach to provide intelligence support to federal cyber centers. CTIIC is a 
multiagency center that integrates intelligence analysis in support of DHS and FBI 
response actions to a significant cyber incident [2]. 
A thorough explanation of the required U.S. government’s efforts to respond to a 
cyber incident is presented in the National Cyber Incident Response Plan [3], one of many 
follow-on efforts in response to the PPDs. The authorities and statutes upon which the plan 
relies further establish the roles and responsibilities of government entities to not contradict 
established laws and precedents. For example, the limitation of the Department of 
Defense’s (DOD) role in protection of critical infrastructure and response to cyber 
incidents reflects the U.S. Code (USC) Title 10 authorities governing the armed services.  
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DHS’s critical infrastructure roles and responsibilities are broad. DHS must protect 
critical infrastructure and manage cybersecurity risks across all sectors. DHS is also 
responsible for resource allocation and prioritization of efforts based upon its 
understanding of risks and consequences of incidents against particular sectors, and DHS 
is specifically responsible for identifying critical infrastructure at the greatest risk [4]. Per 
the 2018 DHS Cybersecurity Strategy, “DHS must improve the cybersecurity of critical 
infrastructure through the development of tools, services, and other offerings, as well as 
through targeted outreach to critical infrastructure owners and operators, service providers, 
and other key enablers of risk management activity” [4]. 
The breadth of roles and responsibilities for the DOD may be narrower than those 
of DHS, but the DOD is directly involved in the task of strengthening the security and 
resilience of critical infrastructure. The DOD is responsible for defending its own networks 
and systems and is potentially responsible for defending sectors of critical infrastructure 
directly tied to national defense activities. To support defense of critical infrastructure 
networks, the DOD conducts operations on foreign networks and provides indications and 
warning to public and private sector partners [5]. The DOD’s efforts in foreign networks 
complements DHS’s efforts domestically to enhance coordination of the whole-of-
government to defeat malicious cyber activity. 
D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
The remainder of this thesis examines what has been defined as critical 
infrastructure and whether the functions performed by DHS, DOD, and other government 
entities adequately address the security and resilience of critical infrastructure. A synopsis 
of critical infrastructure, as defined by each sector-specific agency, with a focus on the 
relationship to cyberspace provides an understanding of the scope of critical infrastructure. 
The impact of PPD-41, United States Cyber Incident Coordination, is then examined as it 
relates to the defense of critical infrastructure from cyber incidents. An assessment of the 
organization structures of DHS and supporting roles of other federal agencies, including 
the DOD, is provided as well, and additional federal policies and resources are examined 
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for refinement of tasks, actions, and authorities of various government entities, as relating 
to protection of critical infrastructure from cyber threats. 
Chapter II provides an examination of U.S. government organization and areas of 
progress since PPD-21 and PPD-41 were enacted. The structure of DHS has changed and 
possibly advanced its critical infrastructure protection efforts. Areas of progress or 
supplemental U.S. government policy addressing critical infrastructure are noted within 
the chapter. The chapter provides some change in perspective from the large scope, sector-
specific framework of critical infrastructure towards a more refined approach. 
Chapter III examines the scope and scale of critical infrastructure by sector, with a 
focus on the cyber components of each sector. Risks and threats to the sector are identified. 
Additionally, each sector is evaluated on criteria defined in Chapter II. 
Chapter IV describes several cyber attacks against critical infrastructure. The 
attacks, effects of the attacks, and subsequent actions by the U.S. government are examined 
and summarized. Attacks are framed in the context of critical infrastructure, categorized 
by the affected sector of critical infrastructure, and analyzed in a manner supporting 
generalized conclusions. 
Chapter V concludes this work with key points and recommendations.  
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II. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE AND PLAN 
DEVELOPMENT 
A. REQUIREMENTS AND ACTIONS 
As stated in PPD-21, DHS is responsible for providing the strategic guidance that 
promotes the national unity of effort upon which effective critical infrastructure security 
relies. The following sections examine specific tasks directed in PPD-21 to DHS, the 
sector-specific agencies, and other components of government. Following that, the plans 
developed, partnerships utilized, and the organizational structure of DHS are analyzed in 
the context of the cyber aspects of critical infrastructure.    
The first strategic imperative of PPD-21 is to refine and clarify functional 
relationships across the federal government in support of the national unity of effort 
towards security and resilience of critical infrastructure. Stated differently, DHS is 
responsible for defining critical infrastructure security relationships in line with the roles 
and responsibilities assigned to organizations.  
An additional PPD-21-prescribed DHS responsibility is coordination with sector-
specific agencies to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure. Identification and 
prioritization of infrastructure is partly accomplished through the sector-specific plans. 
Additional efforts such as hosting sector taxonomies on DHS online portals allow for more 
thorough identification efforts of assets. DHS accepts sector inputs and then prioritizes 
infrastructure based on the National Critical Infrastructure Protection Plan (NCIPP). The 
NCIPP is further examined in Chapter III, Section D. 
An explicit DHS responsibility is creation of two operations centers:  the National 
Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC) and the NCCIC. These operations centers are 
respectively responsible for physical infrastructure and cyber infrastructure. The NCCIC 
includes U.S. Computer Emergency Response Team (US-CERT), as previously noted, and 
also the Industrial Control System Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT).  
PPD-21 prescribes additional roles and responsibilities for DHS and the sector-
specific agencies, and there are additional federal responsibilities delineated as well. These 
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responsibilities pertain to coordination efforts, reporting requirements, and support 
functions. DHS is required to work with sector-specific agencies conducting risk 
management, to coordinate federal response actions to significant incidents against critical 
infrastructure, and to broadly support sector-specific agencies in security activities. 
Implementation of the directive also includes a requirement to update the National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP). 
B. THE NIPP, PARTNERSHIPS, AND THE CYBERSECURITY 
FRAMEWORK 
The NIPP applies to owners and operators of critical infrastructure, sector-specific 
agencies, and any person or entity that has equities in some aspect of critical infrastructure. 
The goal of the plan is to outline and guide national efforts in strengthening the security 
and resilience of critical infrastructure. The plan was “developed in a collaborative process 
with input from all 50 states and stakeholders from all sectors of critical infrastructure [6].”  
The plan provides goals, priorities, methods for evaluation, and a cycle that allows for 
continual input by all entities to whom the plan applies. 
First published in 2009, the NIPP was updated in 2013 in response to PPD-21’s 
promulgation. The update establishes security and resilience of critical infrastructure as the 
primary aspect of planning efforts. The NIPP acknowledges the diverse aspects of critical 
infrastructure and states that the plan itself is meant to be flexible and adaptable to the 
broad spectrum of critical infrastructure. Public and private sector partnerships are 
highlighted as a key ingredient to the unified effort necessary to strengthen the security and 
resilience of critical infrastructure.  
The NIPP defines cyber threats as part of the overall risk environment and 
integrates cyber and physical threats into a single risk management process. The risk 
management process is a cycle of setting goals, identifying assets, analyzing risks, 
implementing mitigations, and measuring effectiveness. Information sharing is a required 
aspect of each step in the cycle. Per the plan, risk management is required by each entity 
involved in protections of critical infrastructure from the owner and operators to federal 
government. Partnerships bolster the risk management process by enabling greater 
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information sharing. As far as prioritization of cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, the 
NIPP states: 
Critical infrastructure community is doing well with integrating 
cybersecurity into core business practices, but government is not doing a 
good job of maintaining funding to infrastructure that requires continued 
investment, such as water, wastewater, energy, etc. This indicates that 
government priorities need to be shifted to physical infrastructure, while 
allowing private sector to continue investing in cybersecurity. [6] 
 The core tenet of partnerships referenced in the NIPP is collaboration between 
public and private sectors of critical infrastructure. The Critical Infrastructure Sector 
Partnerships Advisory Council (CIPAC) was first established by the Secretary of 
Homeland Security in 2006, with the latest charter signed in 2018. It serves as a mechanism 
for public and private sector forums. Through the CIPAC model, each critical infrastructure 
sector independently engages security activities, and the CIPAC facilitates intra-sector and 
cross-sector engagement. The CIPAC is incorporated into the NIPP and follows implicit 
and explicit requirements of PPD-21 that pertain to information sharing and partnerships 
among private sector and government entities that have shared critical infrastructure 
equities. The CIPAC holds periodic meetings with agendas intended to foster stakeholder 
discussion. For example, in October 2018 a meeting with the Election Sub-Sector of the 
Government Facilities Sector was held to discuss working groups and a strategic schedule 
for security efforts in support of the November elections [7]. The CIPAC is not legally 
required to publish meeting minutes making it easier to promote more frank discussions 
between partners. 
The CIPAC includes government coordinating councils (GCC) and sector 
coordinating councils (SCC) for each sector of critical infrastructure and is the partnership 
construct that facilitates interaction between government and private-sector entities. The 
CIPAC assists government in policy advisement and critical infrastructure security efforts. 
The composition of the SCCs requires recognition by the sector-specific agencies [8]. The 
SCCs are organized and governed by private sector industry partners, such as owners and 
operators or industry trade groups. The SCCs are the primary points of collaboration 
between private sector and government. Each SCC approves a charter that establishes 
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objectives, membership, and other council-specific rules, such as leadership of the council. 
Council leadership is either elected by council members or comprised of founding 
members, depending upon the sector. SCC participation is voluntary and is not intended to 
inhibit sector members from establishing direct relationships with DHS or sector-specific 
agencies. For example, the SCC can promote National Institute of Standards and 
Technology (NIST) cybersecurity standards across the sector, then collect feedback and 
provide to the sector-specific agency for sector-specific cybersecurity standards. This 
collaborative cycle was used by the Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector for 
development and implementation of a sector-specific Cybersecurity Framework.     
The SCCs are primarily intra-sector entities. The GCCs, on the other hand, work 
across sectors. The GCCs are chaired by representatives chosen by the respective sector-
specific agencies and are comprised of federal, state, and local government entities [9]. The 
GCCs are therefore in a position to facilitate coordination across jurisdictional boundaries 
for all levels of government. When called for, GCC membership also includes 
representation from regulatory agencies. For example, the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) is a member of the Communications and Information Technologies 
Sectors’ GCCs; the Nuclear Regulatory Commission is a member of the Nuclear Reactors, 
Materials, and Waste Sector GCC. 
The charter for each SCC and GCC establishes its meeting requirements, typically 
quarterly. The GCCs are primarily responsible for drafting and implementing sector-
specific plans, but the SCCs are essential to collecting data and inputs from the owners and 
operators. Both councils are responsible for promoting participation in sector-specific 
activities to include exercises, information sharing networks, and risk management 
processes. 
Partnership structures are standardized across critical infrastructure sectors, though 
information sharing methods differ. DHS hosts material for eight critical infrastructure 
sectors, CISA, and the Department of Energy (DoE) on the Homeland Security Information 
Network (HSIN), and each sector uses the hosted information for sector-specific reasons. 
The Dams Sector hosts its taxonomy on a dedicated HSIN portal. Other sectors access 
threat intelligence via the more general critical infrastructure portal. The Treasury 
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Department, in its role as sector-specific agency, uses its Cyber Intelligence Group to 
evaluate and disseminate sector-specific threat information in collaboration with the 
Financial Services information sharing and analysis center (ISAC) (an organization created 
by owners and operators of critical infrastructure on a voluntary basis for threat mitigation 
and related efforts [10]). The Food and Agriculture GCC and SCC each have dedicated 
HSIN portals, and DHS also releases alerts, warnings, and threat bulletins directly to the 
sector’s GCC and SCC.  
As directed by the 2013 NIPP, the Joint National Priorities for Critical 
Infrastructure Security and Resilience were drafted [11]. These priorities are intended to 
be used by the sector-specific agencies to facilitate development and maintenance of 
sector-specific plans. The priorities allow sector-specific agencies to focus their efforts in 
order to reduce risk to national critical functions, enhance incident response and recovery 
capabilities, improve information sharing, and protect critical infrastructure against nation-
state cyber threats. The priorities are focused on risk management and prioritization of 
cyber and physical threats. 
Developed by the NIST as directed by Executive Order 13636, the Framework for 
Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity guides risk management to cyber threats 
against critical infrastructure [12], [13]. The framework was specifically developed in 
support of cybersecurity of critical infrastructure, though it is intended to be useful to 
organizations in any industry. Similar to the NIPP, the framework facilitates 
standardization of risk management processes for the improvement of critical infrastructure 
security and resilience. 
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework guides an organization through an adaptive 
process to ensure secure and resilient networks. The process aids an organization in 
establishing necessary functions its networks provide, identifying assets, assessing threats 
and vulnerabilities, applying mitigations, and protecting its functions. Once a protected 
network is established, the process provides approaches to detection, response, and 
recovery from cyber incidents. One line item of the framework core states that an 
organization receives threat intelligence from information sharing forums. This particular 
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excerpt is the only element of the framework that ties directly to the NIPP and sector-
specific plans on information sharing. 
C. DHS ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE 
Evolved from the National Protection and Programs Directorate (NPPD) within 
DHS, CISA was established in 2018. NPPD was responsible for the national security 
mission of DHS, and that mission is refined and elevated by the CISA Act of 2018. As part 
of the CISA Act, various organizations within DHS were realigned for efficiency of  
effort [14]. CISA’s primary responsibilities focus on the support of security and resilience 
of critical infrastructure. 
CISA develops and oversees implementation of directives, enforceable under the 
authority of DHS, that apply to federal entities that operate networks within the “.gov” 
domain. For example, DHS directed the removal of Kaspersky branded products from 
federal networks in a 2017 binding directive [15]. CISA ensures compliance with the 
directive for all networks operating on the federal domain. 
The two centers required to be established under DHS by PPD-21, the NICC and 
the NCCIC, are also components of CISA. Both centers provide 24/7 support, and fulfill 
similar  information sharing requirements. The NICC provides situational awareness of 
critical infrastructure for the federal government [16]. NCCIC activities include incident 
response and recovery in particular [17]. 
US-CERT, a previously independent entity, is integrated into NCCIC and is thus a 
part of CISA as well. US-CERT publishes alerts and other cyber threat or vulnerability 
messages, as it did before alignment under CISA. Alerts are publicly available and are 
often directed at private sector industries. 
In addition to the PPD-21 directed sector-based approach to combating the risks to 
critical infrastructure, DHS utilizes a systematic approach to cybersecurity that centers on 
National Critical Functions. National Critical Functions are defined as, “The functions of 
government and the private sector so vital to the United States that their disruption, 
corruption, or dysfunction would have a debilitating effect on security, national economic 
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security, national public health or safety, or any combination thereof” [18]. In its overview 
of National Critical Functions, CISA states, “The National Critical Functions construct 
provides a risk management approach that focuses on better understanding the functions 
that an entity enables or to which it contributes, rather than focusing on a static sector-
specific or asset world view” [18].  
CISA implements the systematic approach of National Critical Functions through 
the National Risk Management Center (NRMC), another collaborative center that works 
with private sector, government entities, and other stakeholders [19]. Functions are 
organized into four categories:  connect, distribute, manage, and supply. The NRMC views 
critical infrastructure holistically, solicits input from each sector, and identifies and defines 
functions that are essential to secure and resilient critical infrastructure. For example, the 
Conduct Elections function is categorized in the manage category. The NRMC works with 
stakeholders across the public and private sectors at federal and local levels to characterize 
the process of conducting elections. The NRMC then engages with CIPAC and 
stakeholders within the Elections Infrastructure Sub-Sector of the Government Facilities 
Sector to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure. Finally, the NRMC provides refined 
risk management support for stakeholders and oversees the risk management process. 
D. CONTINUING EFFORTS 
In 2017, the President signed Executive Order 13800, Strengthening the 
Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure [20]. This order rearticulates 
the importance of cybersecurity and asserts that a cybersecurity risk to any one department 
of government or sector of critical infrastructure can pose a risk to overall national security. 
With this in mind, heads of federal agencies and departments are directed to identify and 
prioritize the greatest risks to their respective organizations. They are also directed to 
identify ways to assist owners and operators of critical infrastructure in protecting against 
cyber threats. The order also promotes a working Internet that is protected and allows for 
the achievement of national objectives in cyberspace. 
As part of its cybersecurity efforts, DHS, through CISA, publishes reports called 
Insights that offer background information on a wide variety of cyber-related topics. For 
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example, there are Insights on Ransomware Attacks, Enhanced Chemical Security During 
Heightened Geopolitical Tensions, and COVID-19 Disinformation Activity [21]. Insights 
are intended to provide information that will aid owners and operators in countering 
cybersecurity risks to critical infrastructure. 
Election security represents a key area of evolution and success, as it relates to the 
government’s efforts to strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure. As 
noted, election infrastructure is a sub-sector of the Government Facilities Sector of critical 
infrastructure, and “Conduct Elections” has also been designated a National Critical 
Function [18]. CISA and its operations centers are engaged and provide continuity of effort 
and information sharing, and CIPAC efforts to establish priorities among sector partners, 
as it did during the October 2018 meeting, are ongoing. As a result, when federal and state 
elections are looked at from infrastructure and function perspectives, the focus and 
protection mechanisms are already established.  
E. SUMMARY   
DHS is leading efforts to develop partnerships and share intelligence, and they are 
utilizing a functions-based approach that effectively augments the PPD-21-directed sector-
based approach to critical infrastructure security. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework is 
currently implemented or in the process of being implemented by all critical infrastructure 
sectors and has received positive feedback. The implementation of the Cybersecurity 
Framework and risk management processes indicates that the policies and partnership 
mechanisms, specifically PPD-21, Executive Order 13636, and CIPAC, facilitates a 
standardized approach to enhancing critical infrastructure cybersecurity. DHS has 
implemented an adaptable and capable approach to accomplishing the task of strengthening 
the security and resilience of critical infrastructure.   
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III. SECTOR ANALYSIS 
According to ADM Rogers (ret.), former Director of the National Security Agency 
(NSA) and Commander U.S. Cyber Command, “As I think many of you are aware, the 
U.S. government has designated 16 segments within the private sector as being of critical 
significance to the nation’s security. Think water. Think power. Think aviation, financial - 
16. U.S. Cyber Command is tasked to be prepared to provide DOD capability to defend 
that infrastructure” [22]. ADM Roger’s statements during his testimony before the House 
Intelligence Committee in November 2014 outlined the DOD’s involvement in the defense 
of critical infrastructure. His statements also highlighted the threats to critical infrastructure 
posed by sophisticated malware possessed by nation-state adversaries.  
During ADM Rogers’ testimony to Congress four years later, he stated, “We need 
to reconsider what is Critical Infrastructure in the digital age” [23]. It was asserted in a 
Homeland Security Affairs essay that “Critical Infrastructure isn’t critical” [24]. The essay 
focused on the September 11, 2001, attacks in New York City, but provides a relevant 
perspective that adds to the assertion that critical infrastructure is poorly defined. From the 
essay:  
While it was unforeseeable at the time, the Lower Manhattan area that was 
most heavily impacted by the September 11, 2001 attacks is more valuable 
today and better positioned for the future than it was prior to 2001. If 
terrorists cannot cripple this nation by toppling 100-story commercial high-
rise buildings, what kinds of facilities would have a debilitating impact on 
the entire nation if they were destroyed? Instead of being designated 
“critical,” the majority of infrastructure facilities are insignificant to the 
functions of the overall system because the loss of these facilities does not 
cause widespread disruptions to the nation, region, or even the local area. 
The worst circumstances may spur the greatest opportunity for positive 
change, which could shift homeland security strategies to focus primarily 
on effective recovery rather than protecting existing systems...A solution 
for accomplishing the task of effectively identifying, prioritizing, and 
protecting CI is to refine the criteria for how facilities are determined to be 
critical. A lower number of critical facilities will reduce the overall scope 
of the protection mission. Adopting a risk-based approach for both 
prioritization of facilities and evaluation of national impacts can assist DHS 
in more effectively designating facilities as “critical.” [24] 
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Notwithstanding that the notion of critical infrastructure may be inadequately 
defined or that categorization by sector may be deleterious to its security, the relevant 
critical infrastructure policy and literature do follow sector categorization. The following 
examination, therefore, takes the same approach. This by-sector examination includes a 
description of each sector’s profile, with specific attention paid to the cyber aspects; risks 
to the sector; and unique legislation or policy that governs the sector. The risks identified 
are specific to cyberspace, but not exclusively so. Some sectors have risks or a history of 
attacks in the physical domain that in some cases were a catalyst for sector-specific 
legislation. The examination also provides a cursory look at prioritization of critical 
infrastructure within sectors, across sectors, and in general.   
Some sectors are so decentralized that the feasibility of a cyber attack reaching the 
level of a significant cyber incident is low, according to the Severity Schema [25]. As part 
of the Severity Schema calculation, which is utilized by NCCIC for standardizing the 
severity of a cyber attack on a national scale, weights are assigned to each sector that 
indicate cyber attacks against some sectors are of greater concern due to their cross-sector 
dependency. DHS resource allocation is prioritized in line with the weights assigned for 
the Severity Schema calculations. For example, the Energy Sector has the highest weight 
due to the determination by DHS and other stakeholders that a cyber attack against the 
Energy Sector would have the highest likelihood of impacting other sectors.  
Each sector-specific plan (a formal plan drafted by the sector-specific agency as a 
required task of PPD-21) asserts the problem of a cyber attack in terms of the worst-case 
scenario. The use of a worst-case scenario may be two-fold: the self-interest of the sector-
specific agency and the directive nature of PPD-21 and the NIPP. PPD-21 does not require 
that sectors of critical infrastructure be further prioritized, yet that is what the DHS 
cybersecurity strategy outlines. The approach to prioritization of critical infrastructure is 
collaborative between DHS, sector-specific agencies, and coordinating councils that 
represent critical infrastructure owners and stakeholders. 
The legislation that is unique to some sectors can also impact the efficiency of 
response efforts and the efforts of the U.S. government to strengthen the security and 
resilience of affected critical infrastructure. In some cases, legislation assigns 
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responsibilities or actions to additional entities in ways that may hamper cyber incident 
response actions or prolong coordination efforts by convoluting the relationship between 
owners and operators and the respective sector-specific agencies. In other cases, 
byproducts of legislation unrelated to PPD-21 can result in improved security practices. 
To provide specific examples of prioritization issues and the legislation that impacts 
critical infrastructure, it is necessary to define and examine each sector. In the following 
section, each sector is evaluated on the following criteria:  expertise or a notable advantage 
of the sector-specific agency; promotion of cybersecurity measures by the partnership 
structure; and legislation, policy, or sector-specific characteristics that enhance security 
and resilience of the sector. To qualify the evaluation, each sector is noted as well organized 
to implement security measures, adequately organized, or inadequately organized. A sector 
meeting all three criteria is considered well organized; meeting two criteria is considered 
adequately organized; and meeting fewer than two criteria is considered inadequately 
organized. 
The three criteria used to evaluate critical infrastructure sectors are derived from 
PPD-21 and supported by policy. The first is expertise or a notable advantage provided by 
the sector-specific agency. Per PPD-21, the sector-specific agency leads its respective 
sector’s security and resiliency efforts and is chosen based on expertise or institutional 
knowledge. Evaluation of the sector-specific agencies supports the sector-specific 
approach to critical infrastructure security and resiliency by focusing on the leadership 
elements of each sector.  
The second criterion used to analyze the sector-specific approach to critical 
infrastructure is promotion of cybersecurity measures by the partnership structure that 
exceeds the minimum standard. The minimum standard is voluntary use of the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework. The partnership structure is important for evaluation of critical 
infrastructure security because most critical infrastructure is owned and operated by the 
private sector. Effective public-private partnership is therefore critical to ensuring national 
unity of effort. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework and the partnership structure are based 
on prescribed policy, as described in Chapter II, Section B.  
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The third criterion is legislation, policy, and sector-specific characteristics that 
enhance or inhibit security and resilience of the sector. PPD-21 notes that each critical 
infrastructure sector is unique in characteristics and risks, and there are often sector-
specific legislation and policies that do not directly pertain to the tasks of PPD-21. The 
legislation and policies can, however, affect security and resiliency efforts. Sector-specific 
characteristics such as a functions-based approach to defining the sector or oversight by 
regulatory agencies can also affect the sector’s security and resilience. Evaluating the 
sector-specific legislation, policy, or characteristics supports the sector-based approach by 
allowing for a non-standard approach to sector security and resilience.  
A. SECTORS OF CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
1. Chemical   
The Chemical Sector is comprised of facilities numbered on the order of magnitude 
of hundreds of thousands. These facilities process, store, and handle various chemicals 
including everything from sulfuric acid to food additives, from fertilizers and pesticides to 
bleaches and toothpastes. As of July 14, 2015, 3,227 facilities were regulated by Chemical 
Facilities Anti-Terrorism Standards (CFATS) and numerous additional chemical facilities 
are subject to further government regulation. For example, as of 2013, 10,500 licensees 
and permittees were subject to Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives 
(ATF) security rules associated with restrictions imposed on explosives [26].  
DHS is the sector-specific agency for the sector. Per the NIPP, sector-specific 
agencies have expertise in their respective sectors. Through CFATS, DHS has been 
assigned permanent authority for security regulations of chemical facilities since 2007. The 
involvement of DHS with chemical facilities is a likely reason for the department’s 
selection as sector-specific agency, but there are nuances to the designation. The entity 
within DHS that is responsible for the Chemical Sector, for instance, is considered a non-
regulatory entity [27]. 
Between 1970 and 2016, 348 incidents of chemical terrorism occurred globally, 
including 29 incidents in North America. From April 2009 to April 2019, the number of 
regulated chemical substances under CFATS increased from 33 million to 149 million [28]. 
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It is difficult to qualify or put these numbers into context:  is the number of incidents truly 
high or simply a result of the large number of potential targets?  Nevertheless, it is safe to 
say that the Chemical Sector is successfully targeted with some frequency.   
Regarding cyber threats, the potential for manmade deliberate attacks is well 
understood. The sector-specific plan states, “Disruptions to these systems could result in 
theft of intellectual property; loss of operations capacity; or a chemical theft, diversion, or 
release. A small portion of [industrial control systems] are updated through Internet-
accessible systems and third-party devices, which exposes Chemical Sector assets to 
additional threats from remote attacks”  [26]. By implication, the plan recognizes that cyber 
attacks against industrial control systems (ICS) and supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) systems of sector facilities can result in toxic releases.  
Unlike other critical infrastructure sectors, the federal government specifically 
regulates cybersecurity for the Chemical Sector [29]. The involvement of the U.S. 
government in the regulation of cybersecurity for the Chemical sector was initiated with 
Executive Order 13650, Improving Chemical Facility Safety and Security [30], released in 
2013. This executive order bound DHS, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and 
the Secretary of Labor to tackle issues of safety and security of chemical facilities and risk 
reduction posed by hazardous chemicals to industry employees and communities. The 
primary focus of the executive order was the prevention of unauthorized weaponization of 
chemicals. Cybersecurity regulation of the sector is not an explicit requirement of the 
executive order but is considered an implicit responsibility.  
Subsequent to Executive Order 13650, the Protecting and Securing Chemical 
Facilities from Terrorist Attacks Act of 2014 became law. An extension to the CFATS Act 
was signed in 2019. The act asserts the necessity of standards and assigns responsibilities 
to various government departments to more fully carry out responsibilities already directed 
by Executive Order 13650 regarding risks associated with hazardous chemicals [31].   
The responsibility to regulate cybersecurity for the sector is assigned by DHS to 
members of the sector coordinating councils. For example, the American Chemical 
Council, a member of the Chemical SCC, facilitates implementation of the NIST 
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Cybersecurity Framework by owners and operators of sector infrastructure [29]. Though 
the national cybersecurity framework applies to more than just the Chemical Sector, the 
requirement to regulate cybersecurity arising from CFATS is a separate, authoritative 
mechanism levied on the sector-specific agency. 
Based on the three criteria, the Chemical Sector is well organized to implement 
security measures. DHS has institutional knowledge of the Chemical Sector based in its 
role assigned in CFATS. Through the actions of the sector-specific agency, cybersecurity 
for the Chemical Sector is enhanced. The scale of facilities is large, but the use of the sector 
coordinating council members to facilitate implementation of the Cybersecurity 
Framework across the sector is an effective use of the partnership structure. The additional 
requirement of DHS regulating cybersecurity through CFATS likely enhances security of 
the sector. The requirements defined in the sector-specific plan, such as site visits and 
accreditations of Chemical Sector facilities, also includes cybersecurity standards.    
2. Commercial Facilities  
The Commercial Facilities Sector is broken into eight subsets:  entertainment and 
media, gaming, lodging, outdoor events, public assembly, real estate, retail, and sports 
leagues. The sector includes everything from the nation’s 1,392 casinos and casino resorts 
to the 1.1 million malls and shopping centers. It also includes amusement parks, hotels, 
museums, sports stadiums, and television and movie production facilities [32]. The sector-
specific plan states, “The sector is characterized not just by the physical facilities, but the 
congregation of people, susceptible to terrorist attacks” [32].  
DHS is assigned as the sector-security agency of the Commercial Facilities Sector. 
As stated in the sector-specific plan, significant portions of the sector’s infrastructure have 
open public access and use of the facilities contributes to the positive economic impact of 
the sector. Primary concerns for the sector are terrorist incidents, such as active shooters, 
and natural disasters. DHS’s role as the sector-specific agency is supported by its 
management of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and its partnerships 
with law enforcement agencies. Through FEMA and law enforcement agency partnerships, 
DHS is well situated to mitigate major risks to the sector. 
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According to the Commercial Facilities sector-specific plan, “The [Commercial 
Facilities] Sector is one of the few U.S. critical infrastructure sectors in which terrorists 
have executed multiple high-profile attacks directly affecting the public, both in the 
physical and cyber domain” [32]. Based on the history of attacks and the evident cyber 
threat, the sector-specific agency warns,  
Building management systems—from heating, ventilation, and air 
conditioning (HVAC) systems, to access control—are increasingly 
computerized, making a growing portion of operations vulnerable to a 
cyberattack or information technology (IT) outage. Due to the [Commercial 
Facilities] Sector’s dependency on the Internet and IT, the failure or 
infiltration of cyber systems would create a significant negative economic 
impact on the sector. [32]   
The potential for attacks against a building management system in this sector 
therefore poses a threat to public health and safety.  
The risks and attack vectors to the sector originating from or facilitated by the cyber 
domain are numerous. “Malicious actors could use social media to disrupt events, facilitate 
attacks, or organize flash mobs, but the sites may also contain valuable information that 
could aid security efforts during an event or recovery” [32]. As the former director of the 
National Counterterrorism Center stated in his testimony before the Senate in 2015:  
Adversaries have successfully executed point-of-sale attacks on large 
retailers and hotels to gain access to confidential data, which has cost 
companies and financial institutions hundreds of millions of dollars. 
Governments have launched targeted cyber espionage or sabotage attacks, 
and there has been an increase in “hacktivism,” or politically motivated 
cyberattacks. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) identified North 
Korea as the source behind recent cyberattacks that published thousands of 
confidential company documents online, including personal email 
correspondences and employee data. [33]  
The Commercial Facilities Sector’s scope is unlikely to be problematic to DHS’s 
sector-specific agency role because the sector-specific plan places the onus is on the owners 
and operators within the sector. Whereas there are requirements within the Chemical 
sector-specific plan for accreditations and site visits by DHS, the Commercial Facilities 
sector-specific plan has no such requirements. The key accomplishments highlighted in the 
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Commercial Facilities plan include greater information sharing resources and efforts, such 
as establishment of a Cyber Working Group, led by DHS. 
The Commercial Facilities Sector is adequately organized to implement security 
measures. Management of the security and resilience of the sector, including the physical 
and cyber domain, is effectively described and managed, and DHS and the component 
organizations possess sufficient institutional knowledge. The sector is predominately 
privately owned, though the establishment of the Cyber Working Group provides an 
adequate public-private partnership structure to promote cybersecurity across the sector. 
There are no notable characteristics, policy, or legislation specifically associate with the 
Commercial Facilities Sector, and the sector-specific plan notes that the sector is under 
minimal regulations. Further, attacks against this sector are unlikely to result in broad 
effects beyond the targeted entity. 
3. Communications  
The Communications Sector is broadly characterized as including physical and 
cyber infrastructure in the categories of broadcast, cable, satellite, wireless, and wired [34]. 
Within those categories, Executive Order 13618 directs provision of the following services 
and programs:  
[Executive Order] 13618 highlights the Federal Government’s need to 
communicate at all times and under all circumstances to carry out its most 
critical and time sensitive functions. The Communications Sector plays an 
essential role by working closely with DHS’s OEC [Office of Emergency 
Communication] to establish and maintain NS/EP [National Security and 
Emergency Preparedness] communication services and programs, including 
the Government Emergency Telecommunications Service (GETS), 
Wireless Priority Service (WPS), and Telecommunications Service Priority 
(TSP) Program. GETS and WPS provide priority completion of wireline 
and wireless calls when the PSTN is congested in an emergency, while the 
TSP program provides for priority restoration and provisioning of 
telecommunication circuits following a disruption of service. [35]  
DHS is assigned as sector-specific agency. Per the sector-specific plan, the Office 
of Cybersecurity and Communications (CS&C) within DHS manages the responsibilities 
of the sector-specific agency for the Communications Sector. The CS&C, along with the 
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Office of Emergency Communication, perform the defining roles and responsibilities of a 
sector-specific agency as defined in the NIPP. Under this structure, DHS has the resident 
expertise to perform as the sector-specific agency. Per PPD-21, the FCC is permitted to 
utilize its expertise and any of its authorities to partner with DHS to increase sector security 
and resilience. 
The nature of the Communications Sector is such that the effects of a cyber attack 
can directly affect the sector’s functioning. For example, a denial of service attack against 
an Internet service provider that degrades the functionality of the provider’s networks or 
services would qualify as an attack against the Communications Sector according to PPD-
21 and as a cyber incident (and possibly a significant cyber incident) according to PPD-41.   
Per the sector-specific plan, one of the primary sector-specific agency roles is inter-
sector coordination. Other critical infrastructure sectors are regarded as customers of the 
Communications Sector. In this regard, the sector-specific plan refers to lifeline functions 
specified in the NIPP: communications, energy, transportation, and water. In other words, 
the NIPP has included communication as a basic and essential function to the operation of 
critical infrastructure in general, so attacks against the Communications Sector can affect 
other sectors as well. 
Based upon the definition in PPD-21, critical infrastructure provides an essential 
service to the nation. In particular, energy and communications systems are classified as 
uniquely critical because all critical infrastructure sectors rely on the functions those 
systems provide. The NIPP similarly characterizes communications as a lifeline function 
and emphasizes that lifeline functions require special attention from sector-specific 
agencies to prioritize infrastructure and identify cross-sector interdependencies. Towards 
this end, Executive Order 13618 establishes the criticality of specific communications 
networks and functions.  
Taken together, PPD-21, the NIPP, the sector-specific plan, and the executive order 
have prioritized based upon lifeline function and infrastructure. Responsibility for 
strengthening the security and resilience of Communications Sector infrastructure belongs 
to CS&C. Per the sector-specific plan, the communications services and programs specified 
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in Executive Order 13618 are a responsibility of a specific DHS office that is well-aligned 
with the Communications Sector. The sector-specific plan also notes that sectors dependent 
on communications as a lifeline function are responsible for their own redundant 
communications, appropriately placing communications resilience of other sectors under 
their respective sector-specific agencies. 
Based on the examination above, the Communications Sector is considered 
adequately organized to implement security measures. The sector-specific agency has 
appropriate institutional knowledge. Given the functions-based sector profile and the 
designation as a lifeline function, the prioritization of sector infrastructure and dedication 
of a separate DHS office by Executive Order 13618 is a notable benefit. There is, however, 
no notable promotion of cybersecurity measures by the partnership structure relative to the 
other critical infrastructure sectors.  
4. Critical Manufacturing  
The Critical Manufacturing sector is comprised of approximately 250,000 firms 
that process raw material into specialized parts and equipment that are important to many 
industries. Sector infrastructure includes the business enterprises that process materials, the 
raw materials themselves, industrial equipment, and the supporting components that enable 
the processing from raw materials to final products. Of note, three quarters of these firms 
have fewer than 20 employees, and fewer than 4,000 firms have more than 500 employees. 
The Critical Manufacturing Sector also includes production of specialized parts and 
equipment and facilities that produce components for defense [36].  
DHS is the assigned as the sector-specific agency for the sector. According to the 
sector-specific plan, the Office of Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP) (now the 
Infrastructure Security Division) fulfills the roles and responsibilities of sector-specific 
agency on behalf of DHS. Given the breadth of the sector, it is not surprising that there is 
no noted expertise resident within DHS that specifically pertains to the Critical 
Manufacturing Sector. 
As a result of disparate specialized production processes, the sector-specific plan 
states, “A major failure or disruption in the sector could result in significant national 
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economic impact and lengthy disruptions that cascade across multiple critical infrastructure 
sectors or regions” [36]. Aside from solely economic impacts, the sector-specific plan 
identifies at least four specific results of failures or disruptions if the sector is 
compromised:  “A large number of fatalities, significant first year national economic 
impact, mass evacuations with prolonged absences of six or more months, and a loss of 
governance or mission execution that disrupts multiple regions or critical infrastructure 
sectors for more than one week resulting in loss of necessary services to the public” [36]. 
The sector-specific plan explains the cyber threat to the sector in the following way:  
Manufacturing processes are typically operated by industrial control 
systems that increasingly use open platforms and common operating 
systems, rather than proprietary system designs. Cyber intruders may aim 
to seize control of the systems to disrupt processes, corrupt information sent 
to facility operators, damage equipment, or steal proprietary information. 
Intellectual property theft through cyberattacks can threaten 
competitiveness, affect business reputation, and subject customers to risk 
from counterfeit products. Intellectual property shared with business 
partners outside the company also becomes subject to the security risk of 
partners’ systems. [36]  
One issue raised in the sector-specific plan is that due to the nature of the sector, 
many manufacturers may utilize the same software platforms, so an exploit of software 
used by one manufacturer might have widespread effects across the sector. The WannaCry 
and Petya ransomware attacks, for instance, impacted owners and operators of this sector’s 
infrastructure long after indications of the attacks were known. In fact, effects to several 
sector corporations were noted months after the US-CERT published mitigations [37] [38]. 
The Critical Manufacturing Sector has unknown or undefined intra-sector and inter-
sector dependencies, and its infrastructure uses a combination of business networks and 
ICS and SCADA systems that use common operating systems and open platforms. Many 
of these unknown dependencies arise from customers in other sectors. For instance, the 
Defense Industrial Base (DIB) might require a shift in a commercial manufacturing process 
to produce a specialized defense product, which in turn requires a specialized part to be 
produced by the Critical Manufacturing Sector. As a result of the unknown 
interdependencies and common operating systems and open platforms, a cyber attack 
against a small firm could easily spread to larger firms that have interdependence due to 
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the nature of manufacturing processes. Alternatively, specialized process of one firm can 
result in long-term impacts to another critical infrastructure sector. 
The sector-specific plan notes that the sector-specific agency is still identifying 
critical cybersecurity functions and assets. The identification process is the first step in a 
strategy to unify cybersecurity efforts between the federal government and sector owners 
and operators. Additionally, the sector promotes use of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
by private sector partners. 
Largely as a result of the lack of sector-specific expertise on the part of the sector-
specific agency and the poorly understood interdependencies associated with this sector, 
the organization of the Commercial Facilities Sector is evaluated as inadequate. While the 
partnership structure adequately promotes cybersecurity measures across the sector, the 
sector-specific agency does not have the requisite expertise or institutional knowledge to 
provide sufficient oversight. Further, the unknown interdependencies coupled with 
increasing use of common software and open platforms across this and other sectors is a 
notable deficiency. 
5. Dams
The Dams Sector of critical infrastructure is tightly defined:  “There are more than 
90,000 dams in the United States—approximately 65 percent are privately owned and 
approximately 80 percent are regulated by state dams safety offices” [39]. The Sector 
includes dams, levees, mine tailings, and navigation locks [40].  
DHS is the assigned as the sector-specific agency, however there is no noted sector-
specific expertise in DHS. As highlighted in the sector-specific plan, other federal 
departments and entities of the Dams Government Coordinating Council (GCC) have 
responsibility for significant portions of the infrastructure. For example, the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers provides oversight to 706 dams, 236 locks, and over 14,500 miles of 
levees, and the Department of the Interior oversees over 600 dams, reservoirs, and canals. 
The lack of sector-specific expertise on the part of the sector-specific agency and the 
disparate organizations responsible for oversight makes partnerships and information 
sharing extremely important for this sector. 
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Perhaps due to the specificity of the Dams Sector, the sector-specific plan includes 
the physical taxonomy of the entire sector. The plan notes the increasing cyber risks posed 
by legacy systems and increased use of cyber systems for remote operations of ICS and 
SCADA systems. Remote cyber operation of sector infrastructure has also resulted in 
centralization of infrastructure controls and operations. This centralization increases the 
risk and consequences posed by an attack on the cyber elements of the sector. The Cyber 
Element sections of the sector-specific plan direct stakeholders to comply with the Dams 
Sector Cybersecurity Guidelines developed by the sector Cybersecurity Working Group 
for mitigation of the cyber risks [40].  
The Dams Sector Cybersecurity Guidelines are a tailored version of the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework that was developed by DHS and the GCC for Dam Sector 
owners and operators. The methodology in both documents is the same. Business owners 
are intended to use the documents to establish risk-based, repeatable, and adaptable 
cybersecurity practices through a series of functions that include simple practices, such as 
using strong passwords, to more advanced management of remote access to cyber systems 
[41], [12]. 
The consequences of a successful attack on Dam Sector infrastructure are not 
oversold. Greater than 10 percent of cropland is irrigated by dams, upwards of 7 percent of 
U.S. electricity is generated by hydropower plants (with a concentration in the Pacific 
Northwest, where 60 percent of electricity is generated by hydropower plants), and 43 
percent of the U.S. population lives by levees that reduce the risk of flooding [39]. The 
sector-specific plan states the following:  
Complete or partial dam failure could result in sudden downstream flooding 
that causes casualties, major destruction and property damage, and 
catastrophic economic consequences with cascading disruptions to the 
Electricity, Transportation Systems, and Water Sectors, among others. A 
levee breach or overtopping could threaten drinking water supplies and 
reduce pumping system capacity, cause major agriculture damage, and 
threaten homes and transportation corridors. Navigation lock damage or 
delay impedes domestic cargo movement of valuable commodities in many 
sectors. If breached, mine tailings and industrial waste impoundments can 
harm human health and the environment...Other sectors rely heavily on the 
support of dams, and an attack on any dam may cause significant harm to 
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another sector, with second and third order effects being as catastrophic as 
a direct attack on any of those supported sectors. [40] 
According to the sector-specific plan, most of the sector’s infrastructure is regulated 
at a state level, about four percent is regulated by various federal agencies such as the 
Tennessee Valley Authority, and some infrastructure is unregulated. While there is no 
specific policy or legislation akin to CFATS, DHS does host an online portal for the Dams 
Sector on the HSIN – Critical Infrastructure, where a detailed taxonomy is maintained in 
order to enhance collaboration between infrastructure owners and operators and DHS [39].  
Despite the lack of sector-specific expertise on the part of DHS, the Dams Sector 
is assessed as adequately organized to implement security measures. Promotion of 
cybersecurity measures is accomplished through a tailored version of the Cybersecurity 
Framework and an information sharing platform. A notable benefit to the sector is a 
relatively tightly defined and regulated sector profile. The tightly defined sector profile 
provides commonalities of the cyber aspects of sector infrastructure and supports the 
tailored version of the Cybersecurity Framework. 
6. Defense Industrial Base  
The DIB Sector is comprised of government and private sector entities on the order 
of magnitude of hundreds of thousands that support U.S. military defense requirements, 
either directly or indirectly [42].  
The DOD is designated as the sector-specific agency for the sector. Aside from 
business partnerships and shared expertise, there is an ongoing exchange of sensitive 
information between the sector-specific agency and the DIB. The trusted relationship 
between sector owners and operators and the DOD aligns with the DOD’s roles and 
responsibilities as sector-specific agency, as described in the NIPP and sector-specific plan. 
The sector taxonomy includes defense systems that if compromised by an adversary 
could have impacts on national security. As stated in the sector-specific plan, attacks occur 
with some frequency. Regarding the cyber threat to the DIB, the sector-specific plan notes:  
The most serious threat to the DIB is the cyber threat. The DIB relies on 
commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) information system products that are 
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often flawed in their design and implementation, thus offering a host of 
vulnerabilities to those who would exploit them. The vulnerabilities are 
sometimes significant and other times too subtle to detect easily. In fact, 
these vulnerabilities are the subject of widespread exploitation efforts by 
individuals and groups within and outside the U.S. [42]    
While the cyber threat is identified as the most serious threat to the sector, a cyber 
attack to this sector would be unlikely to rise to a significant level, partially due to the low 
weighted cross-sector dependency score assigned in the Severity Schema [25]. As stated 
in the sector-specific plan, “Based on longstanding experience, the DIB [sector-specific 
agency] expects that the potential DIB impact on public health and safety will not rise to 
the level of national significance. The DIB [sector-specific agency] postulates the potential 
adverse impact on the national economy from an isolated DIB disruption or failure to be 
insignificant” [42].   
There are unique aspects to the cyber infrastructure within the sector, but no 
legislation specifically targeted at these sector-specific threats. While voluntary, there is a 
prescribed method for establishing trusted relationships and inclusion in designated, 
protected networks (DIBNet) to facilitate sharing of sensitive information between sector 
partners and DOD. According to the sector-specific plan, “[Defense Contract Management 
Agency] conducts assessments on risks and vulnerabilities across the sector. Ultimately, it 
is understood that cyber attacks occur with some regularity against assets within the sector. 
Impact of the attacks are assessed based on the scope and victim of the attack. The attacks 
are often in the form of data exfiltration” [42].  
The DIB sector-specific plan provides for intra-sector infrastructure prioritization, 
using a consequence-based approach to determine how the sector’s infrastructure, if 
unavailable, would degrade DOD mission requirements. Based upon quantitative and 
qualitative assessments, a sector asset may be prioritized by designation as critical 
infrastructure and key resources (CIKR). Per the DIB sector-specific plan, the DOD 
collects more detailed information on CIKR assets, and networks of those assets may be 
subject to DIB cybersecurity activities. 
The DOD’s approach to sector security differs from DHS’s approach for specific 
reasons. First, the DOD is the sector-specific agency for only one sector, so their efforts 
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are more focused. Additionally, cyber attacks against the DIB Sector may directly affect 
the DOD. For example, compromise of proprietary information on the network of a defense 
contractor could lead to compromise of a weapons system utilized by the DOD. 
Conversely, compromise of a network within the Commercial Facilities Sector is unlikely 
to have a direct consequence on DHS. That DOD’s own interests are directly furthered by 
effective sector security further incentivizes their efforts as sector-specific agency. Finally, 
DOD also builds trusted relationships with sector partners through statutory acquisition 
and support processes and can therefore subject those partner networks to DOD 
requirements. 
Based on this examination, the DIB Sector is considered well organized to 
implement security measures. The DOD has trusted relationships and institutional 
knowledge to support its role as sector-specific agency. There are mechanisms for 
utilization of a secure network by sector partners that includes additional cybersecurity 
measures and regulations. Additionally, there are notable security benefits to the method 
of developing trusted relationships between the DOD and private sector partners and the 
assessments and risk evaluation performed through the acquisition process. 
7. Emergency Services  
Law enforcement, public works, fire and rescue services, emergency medical 
services, and emergency management are the subcomponents of the Emergency Services 
Sector. Within these subcomponents is a complex array of personnel, services, and 
systems. There are over 12,000 local police departments and 73 federal law enforcement 
agencies. There are over one million firefighters. Emergency management includes 
Hazardous Materials Response Units, bomb disposal teams, and public safety dive teams. 
There are almost 6,000 public safety answering points for the 9-1-1 system. Finally, there 
are drainage and flood control systems, utility systems, and public facilities that all fall 
under Public Works that are part of this sector [43]. Of the Emergency Services Sector, the 
sector-specific plan notes: 
The [Emergency Services Sector] is the most geographically distributed 
sector with more than 2.5 million personnel serving every location in all 50 
States, five territories, and the District of Columbia. Security and resilience 
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planning and decisions take place primarily at the regional and local level. 
Complex systems and dispersed assets make it difficult to disable the entire 
system, but also pose challenges to coordination across disciplines, regions, 
and levels of government. [43]  
DHS is designated as the sector-specific agency. The in-house expertise for the 
sector resides with FEMA, as priorities of the sector are focused on federal coordination of 
disaster relief and associated use of emergency services. As noted in the sector-specific 
plan, protection of the broad array of sector resources is managed through federal, state, 
local, tribal, and territorial governments and trade organization programs. The scope of the 
sector infrastructure is beyond the capability of DHS to account for; however, DHS directly 
supports protection efforts through grant programs.  
Not surprisingly, the cyber component of the Emergency Services Sector is woven 
throughout the sector. There is increasing use of cyber systems for communications and 
coordination efforts by emergency services, and increased demand for real-time data 
sharing has led to greater reliance on increasingly complex cyber systems. The sector-
specific plan states, “Emergency operations communications, database management, 
biometric activities, telecommunications, and electronic security systems are conducted 
virtually and are vulnerable to cyber disruptions” [43]. Technology has facilitated 
improvements to operations but increased the risk associated with vulnerabilities to these 
systems. Further, delays or disruptions to cyber systems within the Sector can lead to loss 
of life.      
Based upon Emergency Services sector-specific plan, the greatest threats to the 
sector are posed by the sector’s interdependence on other sectors such as the 
Communications, Energy, and IT Sectors. For example, a nationally significant attack 
against the sector is unlikely to result from individual attacks on local emergency service 
units, but rather from an attack against the 9-1-1 network or other emergency services 
networks that utilize cyber infrastructure.  
DHS’s role as the Emergency Services sector-specific agency is similar to its role 
with the Commercial Facilities Sector in that it focuses on enhancing partnerships. Though, 
there is a distinguishable difference from the Commercial Facilities Sector and its reliance 
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on private owners and operators of critical infrastructure. One of the primary forums for 
information sharing and coordination for the Emergency Services Sector is a subset of the 
GCC that is comprised of state, local, tribal, and territorial government partners.  
Based on the criteria of this thesis, organization of the sector is evaluated as 
inadequate. The sector-specific agency has institutional knowledge and relatively strong 
relationships with sector partners due to public ownership of significant portions of the 
infrastructure by federal, state, and local governments. In the sector’s efforts to promote 
cybersecurity, however, it is difficult to effectively assign responsibility. It is specifically 
noted in the sector-specific plan, for instance, that there are challenges to determining what 
level of government is responsible for implantation of cybersecurity standards, such as the 
NIST Cybersecurity Framework. Until these challenges are overcome, the criterion of 
effective utilization of partnerships for cybersecurity measures is not met. There is also no 
legislation, policy, or characteristic that enhances security of the sector. Therefore, the third 
criterion is not met.  
8. Energy Sector  
As stated in the Energy Sector sector-specific plan, the sector’s infrastructure is 
categorized into three segments:  electricity, oil, and natural gas. The electricity segment is 
comprised of 6,413 power plants [44]. The oil and natural gas segments are defined by the 
portion of total national energy output produced by each. Combustion of oil produces one 
percent of the electricity generated nationally; natural gas produces 22 percent [44]. In fact, 
unlike most of the other sector profiles provided in the sector-specific plans, there are few 
metrics put forth to fully describe physical characteristics of this infrastructure sector.  
The DoE is designated as the sector-specific agency, as it has appropriate expertise 
related to the sector’s infrastructure. The description of the DoE as sector-specific agency 
in the sector-specific plan differs from that of the DOD and its roles as sector-specific 
agency for the DIB. The DIB sector-specific plan describes the trusted relationships and 
dependencies between the DOD and DIB partners. The Energy sector-specific plan 
describes the DoE as leveraging its position a federal department to coordinate with DHS, 
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FEMA, EPA, and the Department of Transportation (DoT) for response actions during 
disruptions of power supply.  
While there have been highly publicized events that indicate U.S. adversaries have 
infiltrated various segments of the U.S. power grid [45], the threat and efforts to combat 
the threat are different than what has been portrayed in pop culture and the news media. As 
a result,  considerable government resources can be poorly allocated due to unrealistic 
concerns when those concerns are echoed by elected officials.  Nevertheless, the concerns 
of a cyber attack against the power grid are not unfounded as demonstrated by events 
elsewhere in the world such as the disruption of segments of the Ukrainian national power 
grid in 2015 and 2016 [46].  
As one article posted by Axios [47], an online news agency, after consulting 
cybersecurity experts and government spokespersons stated, there are two problems with 
focusing more attention on the threat than it merits. The first, is unnecessarily frightening 
the populace. The second is pressuring government officials to respond to unrealistic 
threats while desensitizing people to the actual problems. The Axios article also describes 
the resiliency of U.S. power grids and makes the case that the threat of a cyber attack 
against the U.S. power grid is oversold to the public.  
In 2016, the Mission Support Center of the Idaho National Laboratory released a 
report titled, Cyber Threat and Vulnerability Analysis of the U.S. Electric Sector [48]. 
Incidents reported by sector highlighted that the number of reported incidents against the 
Energy Sector were less than half the number of reported incidents against the Critical 
Manufacturing Sector. This data point is difficult to contextualize. Scanning and probing 
accounted for 11 percent of the incidents across all critical infrastructure sectors. The 
intrusions reported across all sectors included 22 on critical systems. However, the types 
of incidents are not categorized by sector.  
Despite the noted resiliency of U.S. power grids by Axios, disruption of energy 
services can result in second and third order effects to supported sectors and can result in 
cascading effects well beyond the Energy Sector. Additionally, successful cyber attacks 
against the Energy Sector are highly likely to result in physical damage. Physical 
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destruction is a possible outcome, for example, of a cyber attack that disrupts flow of 
natural gas through pipelines [49]. Because of the potential for physical damage and effects 
well beyond the sector itself, and it is for this reason that it has the highest rating of all 
sectors according to the Severity Schema.  
Despite this distinction, there is no specific legislation targeted at this sector. 
The sector-specific plan includes several efforts to boost sector resiliency. Aside 
from developing intra-sector partnerships and working with other federal departments, the 
DoE developed and promotes a tailored version of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
across the sector. DoE has also taken follow-on actions to work across sub-sectors and 
identify intra-sector vulnerabilities and risks. Additionally, DoE works with DHS during 
sector-specific exercises, and exercises are promoted across the sector with varying levels 
of engagement. For example, Cyber Storm is a recurring sector-wide exercise led by DHS 
in which DoE fully participates. In addition, emergency response plans developed by DoE 
include organizational level exercises intended to be conducted by sector owners and 
operators. 
The DoE has significant cross-sector responsibilities. Energy, as a lifeline function 
listed in PPD-21, is depended upon by all other sectors, and that is reflected in the 
maximum weighted score of cross-sector dependency in the Severity Schema. The cross-
sector dependencies have cyber components that range from control and monitoring to 
billing functions. The DoE responsibility for response actions in the event of emergency 
loss of power incidents, as noted in the sector-specific plan, primarily involves 
coordination with other federal entities. 
The sector is evaluated as well organized to implement security measures. The 
sector-specific agency has the requisite expertise and institutional knowledge and leverages 
it to the benefit of the sector. DoE also effectively utilizes the partnership structure to refine 
and promote a tailored version of the Cybersecurity Framework. Partnerships are also 
reinforced through resiliency exercises across the Sector. As a lifeline function, there is 
significant cross-sector reliance on the Energy Sector infrastructure. Because of this, the 
sector’s resilience sector is verified through frequent inter-sector exercises. Finally, there 
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is no additional notable policy or legislation that creates conflicts or impacts sector 
security. 
9. Financial Services Sector  
The financial sector includes depository institutions, investment firms, insurance 
companies, and other banking and financial support institutions. The Financial Services 
sector-specific plan states,  “Financial institutions vary widely in size and presence, ranging 
from some of the world’s largest global companies with thousands of employees and many 
billions of dollars in assets, to community banks and credit unions with a small number of 
employees serving individual communities” [50]. The number of institutions included in 
the Financial Services Sector numbers in the thousands, and the sector relies heavily on 
technology, automation, and a secure cyber domain.  
The Treasury Department is the assigned the role of sector-specific agency for the 
Financial Services Sector. The sector-specific plan notes that the Treasury Department has 
institutional knowledge and expertise related to the sector. It is also noted in the plan that 
the particular Treasury Department office assigned sector-specific agency responsibilities 
is not a regulatory entity, a distinction also noted in the Chemical Sector plan.  
The Financial Services Sector is a frequent target of malicious cyber activity. 
According to the sector specific plan: 
Most of the sector’s key services are provided through or conducted on 
information and communications technology platforms, making 
cybersecurity especially important to the sector. Malicious cyber actors 
continue to target the Financial Services Sector. These actors vary 
considerably in terms of motivation and capability, but all cybersecurity 
incidents, regardless of the original motive, have the potential to disrupt 
critical systems, even inadvertently. [50] 
The Treasury Department operates a sector-specific Cyber Intelligence Group to 
comply with PPD-21 and Executive Order 13636 requirements. According to the sector-
specific plan, the Cyber Intelligence Group “identifies and analyzes all-source intelligence 
on cybersecurity threats to the Financial Services Sector; shares timely, actionable 
information that alerts the sector to threats and enables firms’ prevention and mitigation 
efforts; and solicits feedback and information requirements from the sector” [50]. The 
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Treasury Department coordinates with the financial institutions, regulators, and 
appropriate government agencies such as law enforcement to effectively pursue threats 
identified by the Cyber Intelligence Group.  
The sector-specific plan describes the importance of a public policy framework to 
overall sector security, but it does not provide detail as to whether there is adequate policy 
to accomplish the task of strengthening the security and resilience of the sector critical 
infrastructure. For cyber-specific coordination, the plan references the strength of 
information sharing and coordination efforts between the sector’s respective ISAC, 
NCCIC, and the FBI.  
According to criteria, the sector is assessed as adequately organized. The Treasury 
Department has sufficient institutional knowledge and expertise and the department 
maintains robust relationships with financial institutions. The sector’s Cyber Intelligence 
Group provides cybersecurity benefits to sector partners. There is uncertainty, however, as 
to whether or not public policy framework is adequate. There is no notable sector-specific 
characteristic that benefits sector security. 
10. Food and Agriculture Sector  
The Food and Agriculture Sector, like the Commercial Facilities Sector, is almost 
entirely owned and operated by the private sector and is widely geographically dispersed. 
To provide a general understanding of the order of magnitude of the makeup of the sector:  
The Food and Agriculture Sector is almost entirely under private ownership 
and is composed of an estimated 2.1 million farms, 935,000 restaurants, and 
more than 200,000 registered food manufacturing, processing, and storage 
facilities. This sector accounts for roughly one-fifth of the nation’s 
economic activity...In 2014, there were more than 935,000 restaurants and 
institutional food service establishments and an estimated 114,000 
supermarkets, grocery stores, and other food outlets. In addition, as of 
February 19, 2014, there were 81,575 Food and Drug Administration (FDA) 
registered domestic food facilities (warehouses, manufacturers, processors) 
and 115,753 FDA registered foreign food facilities. The United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food Safety and Inspection Service 
(FSIS) also regulates 6,755 establishments for meat, poultry, processed egg 
products, imported products, and voluntary inspection services. 
Additionally, the United States has roughly 2.1 million farms, 
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encompassing 915 million acres of land. Collectively, American farms 
produce $212 billion in crop production. The top five cash-producing 
industries are cattle, poultry and eggs, corn, soybeans, and milk. [51]  
The Department of Agriculture (USDA) and the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS) are co-sector specific agencies for this sector. HHS executes its sector-
specific agency role and responsibilities through the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). 
The USDA, on the other hand, oversees all agriculture related aspects of the sector and 
shares responsibility for food safety with the FDA. The co-sector-specific agencies share 
institutional knowledge and expertise for all aspects of the sector. 
Despite decentralization of sector infrastructure, technological advances have 
potentially increased the threat surface for cyber attacks against the sector. As stated in the 
sector-specific plan, the sector uses ICS and SCADA systems for production and 
processing at many facilities. The use of these systems allows for increased connectivity 
and remote access, but results in greater vulnerability to cyber threats. The sector 
acknowledges its need to better understand the cyber threat [51]. 
The sector-specific plan identifies the wide use of ICS and SCADA systems 
throughout the sector as a commonality of the cyber aspects of the sector. The reliance on 
infrastructure owners and operators to secure this widely dispersed sector is a notable 
challenge. Similar to the Dams Sector, the Food and Agriculture Sector utilizes an HSIN 
portal to disseminate information across the sector. A crux to the information sharing and 
security efforts within the sector is the verification of critical infrastructure information 
and identifying members for access to the HSIN portal. This responsibility is assigned to 
the USDA. Relative to the Dams Sector, the Food and Agriculture Sector is of significantly 
greater scale making this task more daunting. 
The Food and Agriculture Sector is geographically dispersed and comprised of 
owners and operators of different types and sizes, similar to the Commercial Facilities 
Sector. While restaurants and grocery store type facilities are part of the sector, the sector-
specific plan provides more focus on the sector’s industrial components that perform 
farming, processing, and manufacturing processes. In this context, cyber threats to the 
sector are similar to those of the Critical Manufacturing Sector in that they are focused on 
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ICS and SCADA systems. Also similar to the Critical Manufacturing Sector, is the concern 
that an attack against the Food and Agriculture Sector could be rapidly replicated across 
the sector because of the use of similar systems. This potential for replication of attacks 
across the sector is the driving force behind the USDA’s requirement to verify critical 
infrastructure and enable information sharing across the HSIN portal.  
For cybersecurity efforts across the sector, it is noted in the sector-specific plan that 
the USDA relies on DHS’s CS&C. Since the primary risks to the sector are animal and 
crop diseases and food safety rather than cyber threats, so it is reasonable that the sector 
relies on DHS for cybersecurity efforts. The sector-specific plan requires that cybersecurity 
practices for the USDA and FDA meet standards of federal policy, and that the federal 
government cyber assets are secure. Promotion of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework is a 
priority according to the sector-specific plan, though it is described as a future intended 
action for the sector. 
Organization of the sector is considered inadequate based on only one of the three 
criteria being met. The co-sector-specific agencies have required expertise and institutional 
knowledge. The USDA and FDA, however, do not adequately utilize the partnership 
structure to promote cybersecurity among private sector partners that comprise most 
infrastructure owners and operators. This shortcoming is most notably indicated by the 
failure to require utilization of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework and a hands-off 
approach to cybersecurity within the sector overall. Instead, DHS is primarily responsible 
for engagement with sector partners on cybersecurity matters. There are not additional 
characteristics of the sector that enhance security. 
11. Government Facilities Sector  
The Government Facilities Sector now includes the Election Infrastructure 
Subsector. In fact, it was the threat of tampering with the subsector during the 2016 
Presidential Election that sparked a comment from ADM Rogers (ret.) during testimony to 
Congress where he declared the necessity of a reconsideration of what is critical 
infrastructure [23]. At the time, the sector-specific plan was drafted, the sector included 
more than 900,000 constructed assets belonging to the federal government, as well as assets 
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belonging to 56 States and territories, 3,031 counties, 85,973 local governments, and 566 
tribal nations. In addition to the Election Infrastructure, the assets are divided into the 
Education Facilities and National Monuments and Icons subsectors[52]. The sector-
specific plan states, “Collectively this constitutes one of the largest and most complex 
sectors within the NIPP framework” [52]. 
The General Services Administration (GSA) and DHS are co-sector-specific 
agencies for the Government Facilities Sector. GSA is responsible for support functions of 
federal agencies. DHS executes its sector-specific roles and responsibilities through the 
Federal Protection Services, a DHS entity responsible for protection, security, and law 
enforcement functions in federal facilities. Noted in the sector-specific plan, the 
Department of Education and Department of the Interior are also assigned roles and 
responsibilities as sector-specific agencies for the Education Facilities and National 
Monuments and Icons subsectors, respectively.  
The sector also includes special-use military installations, national laboratories, or 
other “structures that may house critical equipment, systems, networks, and functions” 
[52]. With such a diverse set of facilities, the Government Facilities Sector is at risk to a 
wide variety of cyber threats. National laboratories conduct research on sensitive military 
systems and have been targeted in the past by state-sponsored cyber actors similar to those 
that have attacked the DIB. The Election Critical Infrastructure was targeted in the 2016 
and 2018 national elections by a nation-state adversary [53].  
As stated in the sector-specific plan, sector infrastructure is categorized and 
prioritized by use rather than ownership, since ownership is widely spread across the public 
and private sectors. If the infrastructure is publicly owned, the sector-specific agencies 
implement cybersecurity practices in accordance with federal policies and authorities. If 
privately owned, the sector-specific agencies encourage adherence to the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework. The sector-specific plan, relative to other sector-specific plans, 
more thoroughly emphasizes the cyber risks and incorporates the cyber components of 
infrastructure into the risk management processes. Then the sector-specific plan ties cyber 
aspects of the processes directly to the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. This method is 
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distinct from other sector-specific plans that only reference the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework without providing specific guidance. 
The sector is well organized to implement security measures. The co-sector-
specific agencies have institutional knowledge across the sector and authority over 
federally owned portions of the sector. GSA and DHS promote measures through the 
partnership structure to privately owned infrastructure. A sector-specific characteristic that 
benefits security of the sector is the public ownership of a significant portion of 
infrastructure, however federal policies and authorities allow GSA and DHS to require 
cybersecurity measures for publicly owned infrastructure. 
12. Healthcare and Public Health Sector  
The Healthcare and Public Health Sector, like many of the other sectors of critical 
infrastructure, is more expansive than its name may immediately indicate. The sector-
specific plan for the sector states, “The [Healthcare and Public Health] Sector is large, 
diverse, and open, spanning both the public and private sectors. It includes publicly 
accessible healthcare facilities, research centers, suppliers, manufacturers, and other 
physical assets and vast, complex public-private IT systems required for care delivery and 
to support the rapid, secure transmission and storage of large amounts of [healthcare and 
public health] data” [54].  
The HHS is designated as the sector-specific agency for the sector. HHS has 
institutional knowledge and expertise resident in the department.   
According to the sector-specific plan, average daily ransomware attacks against the 
Healthcare and Public Health Sector increased from 1,000 to 4,000 in the period from 2015 
to early 2016 [54]. The increasing reliance on IT services for storage and transmission of 
sensitive health information corresponds to increasing cyber threats. Sophisticated cyber 
actors threaten security by stealing intellectual property, harvesting personal health 
information, degrading or denying access to data, among other forms of attack. The HHS 
Secretary responded to the increased cyber threats by creating the Office of the Assistant 
Secretary for Preparedness and Response (ASPR), to which he delegated leadership 
responsibility for implantation of PPD-21 and NIPP activities. The ASPR established the 
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CIP Program Office to manage security and resilience responsibilities and further 
collaboration among sector partners. 
The CIP Program Office relies heavily on partnerships [55]. While the approach is 
called unique by the sector-specific agency, the underlying method has similarities to many 
other critical infrastructure sectors. As with many sectors, there are both public and private 
equities. Partnerships between public and private sector, in the form of various 
coordinating councils, is a common form of effort among sector-specific agencies. The 
primary noted difference is the organizational structure of the sector-specific agency for 
addressing critical infrastructure protection efforts. The development of the CIP Program 
Office and the proactive leadership approach to the partnership structure is different from 
other sectors, such as the Energy Sector, that rely on DHS leadership. For example, the 
ASPR drafted the National Health Security and Strategy Implementation Plan. that is 
tailored to the Healthcare and Public Health Sector. Further, the plan the CIP Program 
Office’s leadership in partnership engagement to enhance sector security. 
According to HHS, the HHS Chief Information Officer did review and provide 
inputs to the 2020 budget in order to ensure compliance with the Federal Information 
Technology Acquisition Reform Act and that efforts are made to secure the cyber 
components of the sector [56]. However, the HHS budget does not impact private sector 
healthcare, and there is uncertainty as to where government responsibility starts and ends 
in protecting the cyber domain of the Health and Public Healthcare Sector. This uncertainty 
is a deficiency in the security of the sector. 
Sector organization is considered adequate based on the criteria. The sector-specific 
agency has expertise and institutional knowledge, and HHS promotes cybersecurity 
measures across the sector through its implementation of a dedicated program office. There 
is no sector-specific characteristic that benefits sector security. Further, unlike Government 
Facilities Sector, the Health and Public Healthcare Sector is not in a position to leverage 
publicly owned infrastructure to enhance sector cybersecurity.  
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13. Information Technology Sector  
The IT Sector may be the most difficult sector of critical infrastructure to identify 
and enumerate. According to the sector-specific plan, “Unlike many critical infrastructure 
sectors composed of finite and easily identifiable physical assets, the IT Sector is a 
functions-based sector that comprises not only physical assets but also virtual systems and 
networks that enable key capabilities and services in both the public and private sectors” 
[57]. A successful attack against a critical function of the IT Sector would be significant 
due to its cross-sector dependency. Of note, the sector’s weighted cross-sector dependency 
score is second to Energy on the Severity Schema. However, the only cyber attack 
identified as having a likelihood greater than low is the breakdown of a single interoperable 
Internet, and this corresponds to the critical IT function of providing domain name 
resolution services that is specified in the sector-specific plan [57]. Loss of domain name 
resolution services causes significant degradation to Internet services for potentially 
significant portions of an Internet.  
DHS is designated as the sector-specific agency for the IT Sector. The CS&C 
carries out the role and responsibilities of sector-specific agency on behalf of DHS. There 
is no specific expertise noted in the sector-specific plan. As a result, IT Sector security 
substantially relies on the Sector Coordinating Council which includes Internet service 
providers, DNS (domain name system) root and Generic Top-Level Domain operators, 
communications companies, software companies, and others [57]. When gauging what 
government’s role should be in protecting the sector from cyber attacks, it worth noting 
that the sector is comprised of those entities that keep the Internet functioning on a daily 
basis and that those entities may be better positioned than government agencies to protect 
sector assets.  
The role DHS takes as sector-specific agency for the IT Sector is noticeably 
different than for other sectors to which it is assigned as sector-specific agency. DHS leads 
partnership engagements and activities, like it does for other sectors, though the 
culmination of its engagement activities in this case is a series of cybersecurity exercises. 
According to the sector-specific plan, the cybersecurity exercises of the IT Sector are the 
most comprehensive government-sponsored exercises of their kind. Instead of validating 
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sector infrastructure, such as the sector-specific agency does for the Dams or Food and 
Agriculture Sectors, DHS works with sector councils to delineate sector critical functions 
in a rapidly changing technology-driven landscape. The distinctly different approach to a 
functions-based sector when compared to the approach to a facilities-based sector 
demonstrates an adaptability of DHS in its role as sector-specific agency.  
Based on the above analysis, sector organization to implement security measures is 
evaluated as adequate. The sector-specific agency does not have significant sector-specific 
institutional knowledge or any noted advantage, but it does have a robust Sector 
Coordinating Council upon which it can rely. DHS effectively promotes cybersecurity 
measures through partnerships and collaboration to define critical functions and prioritize 
security efforts across the sector around those functions. Additionally, the sector-specific 
plan notes that DHS is engaged with partners to develop a tailored version of the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework. A sector-specific characteristic that enhances security is the 
frequent conduct of cybersecurity exercises focused on the security and resilience of the 
sector’s functions-based infrastructure. 
14. Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector  
At the opposite end of the spectrum from the IT Sector, with regards to scope, is 
the Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector:  “The Nuclear Sector is the most closely 
regulated of all infrastructure sectors, and the nuclear industry has taken additional steps 
to protect assets, respond to and recover from incidents, and enhance resilience” [58]. The 
sector is also limited in scale, relative to the other Sectors, with the following components 
[59]:  
∑ 99 Active Power Reactors  
∑ 18 Decommissioning Power Reactors  
∑ 31 Research and Test Reactors  
∑ 8 Active Nuclear Fuel Cycle Facilities  
∑ 20,000 Licensed Users of Radioactive Sources  
∑ Over 3 Million Yearly Shipments of Radioactive Materials 
DHS is designated as the sector-specific agency for the sector, and the 
Infrastructure Security Division executes these responsibilities. Per the sector-specific 
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plan, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), an independent federal agency, provides 
data on sector infrastructure. PPD-21 directs the NRC fulfill its regulatory role and 
collaborate with DHS in support of sector security and resiliency. 
The coordinating councils and the sector-specific agency for the sector have 
developed a tailored version of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework Implementation 
Guidance. The sector-specific agency and the coordinating councils recognize the 
uniqueness of the sector, based upon historical safety trends and a public fear of disaster 
posed by nuclear power plants [60].  
Based on this examination, the sector is well organized to implement security 
measures. Though, DHS does not have institutional knowledge or expertise, close 
collaboration with the NRC reasonably mitigates the deficiency. NRC has expertise 
derived from its regulatory function. DHS promotes cybersecurity via a tailored version of 
the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. Sector security also benefits from a tightly defined 
sector profile, similar to the Dams Sector. Finally, the sector benefits from well-regulated 
infrastructure. As noted in the sector-specific plan, the NRC enforces cybersecurity 
regulations at each facility, and DHS, as the sector-specific agency, conducts independent 
review of cybersecurity risks to the sector.   
15. Transportation Systems Sector  
The Transportation Systems Sector includes numerous public entities and private 
companies as well as the transportation veins such as roadways, waterways, and railroads. 
Fortunately, the sector’s infrastructure is well categorized and defined. The following is 
the seven subsectors of the Transportation Systems Sector [61]:  
∑ Aviation includes aircraft, air traffic control systems, and about 19,700 
airports, heliports, and landing strips.  
∑ Highway and Motor Carrier encompasses more than 4 million miles of 
roadway, more than 600,000 bridges, and more than 350 tunnels.  
∑ Maritime Transportation System consists of about 95,000 miles of 
coastline, 361 ports, more than 25,000 miles of waterways, and 
intermodal landside connections.  
∑ Mass Transit and Passenger Rail includes terminals, operational 
systems, and supporting infrastructure for passenger. Public 
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transportation and passenger rail operations provided an estimated 10.8 
billion passenger trips in 2014.  
∑ Pipeline Systems consist of more than 2.5 million miles of pipelines 
spanning the country and carrying nearly all of the nation’s natural gas 
and about 65 percent of hazardous liquids, as well as various chemicals. 
Above-ground assets, such as compressor stations and pumping 
stations, are also included.  
∑ Freight Rail consists of seven major carriers, hundreds of smaller 
railroads, over 138,000 miles of active railroad, over 1.33 million freight 
cars, and approximately 20,000 locomotives. An estimated 12,000 trains 
operate daily. The Department of Defense has designated 30,000 miles 
of track and structure as critical to mobilization and resupply of U.S. 
forces.  
∑ Postal and Shipping moves about 720 million letters and packages each 
day and includes large integrated carriers, regional and local courier 
services, mail services, mail management firms, and chartered and 
delivery services.  
The DHS and the DoT have been designated as co-sector-specific agencies for the 
sector. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and U.S. Coast Guard are 
executive agents for DHS and execute the roles and responsibilities of co-sector-specific 
agencies along with the DoT. The TSA and Coast Guard have security responsibilities for 
aspects of the sector independent of their roles and responsibilities to the co-sector-specific 
agencies. 
The cyber domain of the sector includes “positioning, navigation, tracking, 
shipment routing, industrial system controls, access controls, signaling, communications, 
and data and business management” [61]. The cyber domain of the sector spans each 
subsector. For example, the Highway and Motor Carrier subsector cyber infrastructure 
includes traffic management systems and cyber systems for operational management. Like 
many of the other critical infrastructure sectors, the Transportation Systems Sector spans 
the entire nation.   
While the sector-specific plan does not further prioritize subsectors, a DHS press 
release from late 2018 indicates that further prioritization within the sector was needed 
[62]. According to the press release, DHS and the Oil and Natural Gas Sector Coordinating 
Council engaged in a meeting that was led by the TSA Administrator and the NPPD Under 
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Secretary for the purpose of discussing the Pipeline Cybersecurity Initiative [63]. Other 
parties involved included the TSA, NRMC, and DoE.  
Within two months of the press release, a Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) report identified significant vulnerabilities and threats to the pipeline systems [63]. 
The GAO report criticized TSA’s implementation of the NIST’s Framework for Improving 
Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity and TSA’s assessments for physical and cyber 
security.  In tandem with the GAO report, the Senate Energy and Natural Resources 
Committee sent a letter to DHS [48], requesting DHS perform an assessment of pipeline 
security and associated infrastructure as a response action to the GAO findings. In the letter 
from the senate committee, TSA is criticized for its shortcomings in protecting the 
pipelines.  
Poor security implementation by TSA and misalignment of sector-specific agency 
responsibilities for the pipeline subsector negatively impact Transportation Sector security. 
As noted in the GAO report, TSA is primarily responsible for security of pipeline 
infrastructure, though the transport of oil and natural gas is described as part of the Energy 
Sector. Thus, implementation of the Pipeline Cybersecurity Initiative is the responsibility 
of DHS. The DoT, a co-sector-specific agency has no equities in the pipeline subsector.  
In the other two sectors that have co-sector-specific agencies, Food and Agriculture 
and Government Facilities, the co-sector-specific agencies have aligned responsibilities. 
For the Food and Agriculture Sector, the USDA is responsible for all aspects of agriculture 
and the FDA is responsible for food safety. The responsibilities complement each other 
and the diverse aspects of the sector that encompasses crops, farm animals, processing of 
foods, restaurants, and grocery stores. For the Government Facilities Sector, one co-sector-
specific agency is responsible for the support functions of sector facilities; the other is 
responsible for the protection of the facilities. Unfortunately, this is not the case for the 
Transportation Sector, as there are incongruent security responsibilities evident between 
the DHS and DoE. The DoE has sector-specific agency responsibilities for the transport of 
natural gas and oil. DHS’s TSA has sector-specific agency responsibilities for the pipelines 
that transport natural gas and oil. Though, the Pipeline Cybersecurity Initiative is led by 
DHS’s NRMC.  
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As the blistering assessment of pipeline security clearly indicates, organization of 
the sector is inadequate. TSA and the U.S. Coast Guard, as executive agents of DHS, have 
institutional knowledge derived from their independent security responsibilities for the 
sector; however, implementation of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework by TSA is 
deficient, as noted in the GAO report. There are no sector-specific characteristics that 
benefit sector security. Also, the competing federal department responsibilities that results 
from such diverse subsectors is a likely impediment to sector security. 
16. Water and Wastewater Systems Sector  
The Water and Wastewater Systems Sector is comprised of two components: 
utilities providing drinking water and utilities providing wastewater services. The drinking 
water utilities also provide water for services that include fire protection, healthcare, and 
heating and cooling. Wastewater utilities, on the other hand, treat domestic sewage and 
wastewater produced from industrial processes. The sector includes both public and private 
utility services[64].  
The drinking water component of the Water and Wastewater Systems Sector is 
comprised of approximately 153,000 Public Water Systems. Public Water Systems are 
comprised of three elements, with each element subdivided. The physical element is 
subdivided into the infrastructure and processes that take water from its origin source and 
deliver it to the customer. The human element includes employees and contractors that 
manage and operate all aspects of the sector [64].  
The final element of the sector’s drinking water component is the cyber element 
which is divided into three subcomponents. The first subcomponent is the SCADA systems 
that “are part of integrated control systems essential to operation of drinking water utilities” 
[64]. The second subcomponent is process systems and operational controls not controlled 
by SCADA systems. The third subcomponent is the enterprise systems including the 
business networks that provide customer billing, emails, and other applications.  
The wastewater component of the sector includes 16,500 publicly owned treatment 
works, with services provided to more than 227 million people. The wastewater component 
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is also divided into the physical, human, and cyber elements that are nearly the same for 
the wastewater component as they are for the drinking water component of the Sector [64].  
The EPA is designated as the sector-specific agency. The EPA is a federal 
regulatory agency, however the sector-specific plan does not describe the EPA’s roles and 
responsibilities as sector-specific agency. 
Sector risks are prioritized according to three categories. The most significant risks 
are defined as, “Risks that need the Water and Wastewater Sector’s most urgent attention 
and greatest resources, based on the pervasiveness of the threat or the potential high impact. 
Priority activities should directly mitigate one or more of these risks” [64]. The sector’s 
Strategic Priorities Working Group prioritized “cyber events” within this most significant 
risk category. 
The EPA and other members of the sector were recently involved in research at the 
Department of Energy Idaho National Laboratory to investigate potential effects of a cyber 
attack on a water utility. Based upon the research, the EPA promulgated the following to 
sector partners [65]:  
Cyber-attacks on water or wastewater utility business enterprise or process 
control systems can cause significant harm, such as:  
∑ Upset treatment and conveyance processes by opening and closing 
valves, overriding alarms or disabling pumps or other equipment  
∑ Deface the utility’s website or compromise the email system  
∑ Steal customers’ personal data or credit card information from the 
utility’s billing system  
∑ Install malicious programs like ransomware, which can disable business 
enterprise or process control operations  
These attacks can: compromise the ability of water and wastewater utilities 
to provide clean and safe water to customers, erode customer confidence, 
and result in financial and legal liabilities. [66]  
Compared to sectors with regulatory bodies sector cybersecurity is insufficiently 
addressed. For example, cybersecurity of the Chemical Sector and the Nuclear Reactors, 
Materials, and Waste Sector is regulated by DHS and the NRC as part of the regulatory 
responsibilities of each entity. The Water and Wastewater sector-specific plan defines the 
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cyber elements of the sector’s infrastructure, and the EPA conducts research into cyber 
threats and publishes information on the potential effects of a cyber attack against the 
sector. There is no effort, however, at implementation oversight or cybersecurity 
accountability noted in the sector-specific plan.  
Based on these observations, sector organization to implement security measures is 
assessed as inadequate. The sector-specific agency has the requisite institutional 
knowledge and authority derived from its regulatory role. Unfortunately, the sector-
specific agency does not promote cybersecurity measures through its partnership structure. 
There is no notable characteristic of the sector that enhances security.  
B. SECTOR-SPECIFIC AGENCY COMPARISONS 
Based on the analysis of the previous section, five critical infrastructure sectors can 
be considered well organized to implement security measures based on the three criteria: 
Chemical, DIB, Energy, Government Facilities, and Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and 
Waste. Six sectors were characterized as adequately organized:  Commercial Facilities, 
Communications, Dams, Financial Services, Health and Public Healthcare, and 
Information Technology. Finally, five sectors were evaluated as inadequately organized:  
Critical Manufacturing, Emergency Services, Food and Agriculture, Transportation, and 
Water and Wastewater Systems. Water and Wastewater Systems is the only sector that 
failed to meet at least one criterion. 
DHS is the sector-specific agency or co-sector-specific agency for 10 of the 16 
sectors, but its role differs from sector to sector. For example, DHS’s primary role with the 
Commercial Facilities and Emergency Services sectors is management of the partnership 
structures that facilitate coordination within the sector, across sectors, and with other 
federal agencies. DHS role with regards to the Chemical Sector, on the other hand, includes 
the regulation of cybersecurity. In this case, the more authoritative role emerged as a 
secondary effect of CFATS legislation. For the Dams Sector, DHS facilitates intra-sector 
oversight of infrastructure taxonomy through a DHS-hosted portal. 
The Dams, Energy, and the Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sectors have 
implemented tailored versions of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework that were developed 
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in part by the sector-specific agencies. Along the same lines, the IT Sector was in the 
process of developing a tailored version of the Cybersecurity Framework at the time of the 
sector-specific plan publication. Other sectors implement the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework without modification to meet NIPP requirements. In the case of sectors falling 
under HHS and GSA implementation is hindered by the mix of public and private 
ownership of sector infrastructure.  
For the IT Sector, DHS applies a different methodology for defining infrastructure 
than it does in its role as sector-specific agency for other sectors in that they manage this 
sector by its functions rather than its facilities. The use of critical functions is apt for a 
technology and services-based sector. The critical functions that comprise the IT Sector, 
though, should not be confused with the lifeline functions characterized in PPD-21 and the 
NIPP or the National Critical Functions (further defined in section C). 
Likely due to the distinctly different subsectors, the DoT and DHS, co-sector-
specific agencies for the Transportation Sector, rely on other departments to coordinate 
sector security efforts more than other sector-specific agencies. The security challenges of 
the sector are not, however, distinctly different than that of other sectors. The 
Transportation Sector, like several other sectors, relies on ICS and SCADA systems, and 
similar to the Dams Sector is evolving towards more remote operations of mechanical 
functions for its infrastructure. 
The Chemical; the Nuclear Reactors, Materials, and Waste Sector; and Water and 
Wastewater Treatment Sector have regulatory agencies to which they are responsible for 
administration of their infrastructure. Of these, the Water and Wastewater Treatment Sector 
is the only sector to have its regulatory agency dual-hatted as the sector-specific agency 
under PPD-21. Notably, the Water and Wastewater Treatment Sector is also the only one 
of the three sectors to not have cybersecurity regulated by either its regulatory agency or 
the sector-specific agency. The dual-hatted function is not necessarily causation for the 
lapse, however. The sector-specific agency for the Water and Wastewater Treatment Sector 
has established goals to enhance security of the cyber elements of its infrastructure.  
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The sector-specific agencies and the corresponding plans align with the NIPP 
requirements to develop a sector profile, assess risks, and outline efforts to protect critical 
infrastructure. Sector-specific agencies are responsible for prioritizing within sectors. 
Section C of this chapter details DHS’s responsibility for prioritization across sectors, 
which is part of the security challenge for critical infrastructure.  
C. SECTOR-SPECIFIC LEGISLATION AND DIRECTIVES
There are sector-specific legislation and directives that pertain to certain critical
infrastructure sectors. A closer look indicates that this does not implicitly introduce 
counterproductive ambiguity, conflicts, or redundancy counterproductivity, though. In 
fact, in some instances, the unique legislation may be aiding prioritization efforts. 
The Chemical Sector is directly affected by Executive Order 13650 and CFATS. 
As previously mentioned, the Executive Order and the standards set forth in CFATS 
resulted in the Chemical Sector being the only sector with its cybersecurity directly 
regulated by the federal government. Executive Order 13650 establishes a federal agency 
working group, and a division of CISA provides one of the three co-chairs.  
Executive Order 13618 prioritizes segments of the Communications Sector 
infrastructure. The order addresses the need for unabated communication between certain 
components of government related to national security and emergency preparedness. DOD 
and DHS assigned oversight of the development of systems of communication and long-
term strategies. The DOD is assigned responsibility for the needs of the Executive Branch 
of government with respect to national security and emergency preparedness 
communications networks. The DHS, on the other hand, is assigned responsibility for 
sustainment of the same communications networks to ensure continuity of government. 
Additional responsibilities are assigned to other federal departments. For example, the 
Administrator of Government Services is directed to maintain a common method of 
acquisition of equipment by federal entities. None of these conflict with roles and 
responsibilities delineated in PPD-21; however, so the executive order’s impact on the 
sector’s cybersecurity is negligible. 
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The 2018 Pipeline Cybersecurity Initiative was promulgated by DHS in response 
to criticism levied against the TSA for lack of pipeline infrastructure security. According 
to the GAO report, TSA did not provide a standard of implementation for the NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework [49]. The Pipeline Cybersecurity Initiative is managed by CISA 
through the NRMC. The initiative prioritizes certain infrastructure within a diverse sector 
of critical infrastructure and focuses efforts of various partnerships. The GCC for the sector 
provides a forum for DoT, DHS, and DoE to resolve redundant efforts and in that regard 
improves the sector’s unity of effort.  
Existing sector-specific legislation and executive orders do not conflict with the 
sector-specific agency efforts to strengthen the security and resilience of critical 
infrastructure. The results of the unique efforts are prioritization of infrastructure within a 
sector, more refined information flow, and focused efforts within the sector-specific 
agency. There are no noted instances of legislation- or policy-manded efforts that 
contradict with PPD-21 or PPD-41 requirements or responsibilities. 
D. DHS CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PRIORITIZATION 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND INCLUSION OF NATIONAL CRITICAL 
FUNCTIONS 
In accordance with the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, DHS is the lead coordinator 
in the national effort to identify and prioritize the nation’s critical infrastructure. DHS 
executes this responsibility through the NCIPP, which includes data calls to identify 
domestic infrastructure that would, if disrupted, cause national or regional catastrophic 
effects [67]. DHS maintains four levels of critical infrastructure for this purpose based on 
the following criteria [67]:  
Level 1 (All Sectors):  Infrastructure that, if disrupted, could result in very 
significant consequences to human life, the economy, national security, or 
property.  
Level 2 (Agriculture and Food Sector-Specific):  Infrastructure that, if 
disrupted, could result in significant consequences to international, national, 
or regional economic stability, national security, or property.  
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Level 3 (All Sectors):  Infrastructure that does not meet Level 1 or Level 2 
criteria but is recognized by Sector leadership to be so important to the 
Nation as to warrant special consideration.  
Level 4 (All Sectors):  Infrastructure submitted by each state or territory 
utilizing their own criteria.  
In 2013, the GAO released a report critical of the changes DHS made to the criteria 
for assets added to the NCIPP [67]. According to the GAO, DHS switched to a 
consequence-based approach for identifying infrastructure that should be on the NCIPP 
asset list. The GAO declared the approach to be counter to the NIPP and applicable laws. 
GAO did acknowledged that DHS worked with the sector-specific agencies and other 
appropriate entities in a proactive manner to assist in nominating assets. Of note, the GAO 
findings established that DHS’s approach may convolute its efforts to apply a common 
approach across all sectors of critical infrastructure. The GAO recommended, in its 2013 
report to Congress, that a peer review of the NCIPP should be conducted.  
Possibly the most adverse takeaway from the GAO report is that state-level critical 
infrastructure partners did not want to participate in the nomination process for adding 
assets to the NCIPP, citing the cumbersome process and difficulty working with DHS. As 
noted in the NIPP and sector-specific plans, partnerships are paramount to the security of 
critical infrastructure. Aspects of the partnerships are voluntary, and private sector critical 
infrastructure owners and operators are not compelled to take actions directed by the sector-
specific agencies, such as implementing the Cybersecurity Framework. Any breakdown in 
the partnerships adversely affects the security and resilience of critical infrastructure. 
Prioritization efforts are a key aspect of DHS’s responsibility to strengthen the 
security and resilience of critical infrastructure. The GAO report acknowledges that critical 
infrastructure is dynamic, and this is evident in the sector specific plans. The dynamics that 
must be addressed include evolving technology of the IT Sector and voluntary reporting 
by infrastructure owners and operators. As noted in the Dams, for instance, sector specific 
plan, the sector’s infrastructure is quantifiable, but ownership has not been identified for 
all sector infrastructure. DHS is executing its responsibility to prioritize critical 
infrastructure across all sectors, and the criticisms noted in the GAO report validate the 
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security challenge presented by the categorization of critical infrastructure. Specifically, 
the sector categorization of critical infrastructure does not provide for a standard approach 
by sector-specific agencies to strengthen the security and resilience of critical infrastructure 
meaning that each agency is free to address the issue as it sees fit. 
The CISA is constituted within DHS to execute its national cybersecurity 
responsibility. CISA “is the Nation’s risk advisor, working with partners to defend against 
todays’ threats and collaborating to build more secure and resilient infrastructure for the 
future” [68]. CISA partners with public and private entities to focus on the threats posed to 
critical infrastructure, whether those threats are physical attacks by a terrorist, a natural 
disaster, or cyber attacks from a nation-state adversary. Aside from partnerships across the 
federal government and private sector, CISA is charged with protecting the “.gov” domain 
[68]. CISA sits within the hierarchy of DHS alongside the U.S. Coast Guard, the Secret 
Service, TSA, FEMA, and several other entities [69].  
Within CISA exists the NRMC. CISA, as the parent organization, defines NRMC 
thus:  
NRMC works in close coordination with the private sector and other key 
stakeholders in the critical infrastructure community to: Identify; Analyze; 
Prioritize; and Manage the most strategic risks to our National Critical 
Functions—the functions of government and the private sector so vital to 
the United States that their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would 
have a debilitating impact on security, national economic security, national 
public health or safety, or any combination. [68]  
While National Critical Functions are a focus of the NRMC, CISA addresses 
critical infrastructure cybersecurity through the PPD-21 sector-based approach. PPD-21 
specifically identifies each sector and assigns a sector-specific agency. As noted in Chapter 
I, the DHS Cybersecurity Strategy defines the cybersecurity role of DHS as including the 
assurance “that growing cybersecurity risks across all critical infrastructure sectors and 
other systems that impact national security, public health and safety, and economic security 
are managed at an acceptable level” [4].  
NRMC prioritizes critical infrastructure using a functions-based approach that 
overlaps with the PPD-21 sector-based approach. For example, the National Critical 
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Function “Conduct Elections” has corresponding Election Infrastructure that is a subsector 
of the Government Facilities Sector. Similarly, the National Critical Function “Manage 
Wastewater” encompasses Water and Wastewater Systems critical infrastructure. The 
functions-based approach of the NRMC is an additional method of enhancing critical 
infrastructure security and is further described in Chapter IV. 
  
56 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
57 
IV. CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
As noted in the sector-specific plans, cyber attacks against critical infrastructure 
have occurred and are expected to increase in both frequency and sophistication. The 
following examples provide insight into the breadth of the threat and demonstrate the 
notion that cyber attacks against critical infrastructure are not isolated events against 
individual targets but are often complex campaigns lasting years. These examples also 
provide a lens through which to examine the effectiveness of the PPD-21 development and 
implementation.      
A. NORTH KOREA CYBER ATTACK AGAINST SONY ENTERTAINMENT 
PICTURES  
According to a U.S. investigation, in November 2014 likely North Korean state-
sponsored cyber actors infiltrated Sony Entertainment Pictures networks in preemptive 
retaliation for the planned release of a film that mocked North Korea and its president. The 
cyber actors exfiltrated and deleted data from company servers and damaged thousands of 
computers. Most importantly, some of the exfiltrated data was released by the attackers to 
the embarrassment of the company, and more releases were threatened [70], [71].  
Sony eventually declared that the financial effect of the cyber attack was not 
significant and estimated damage of approximately $15 million (mostly recovered through 
insurance). Another effect attributed to the cyber attack was the resignation of the Sony 
Pictures chairwoman due to content of released personal emails that was deemed offensive 
after public scrutiny. The attack, aside from resulting in the release of damaging 
information, did prevent the movie from being screened by national movie theater chains. 
Further, follow-on intimidation in the form of threats to release additional information led 
some employees to file lawsuits against Sony for not protecting personnel data [71].  
In response to the cyber attack, the U.S. government levied additional sanctions 
against North Korea, published information about the attack, indicted a North Korean cyber 
actor, and publicly upbraided the North Korean government for its role. The published 
information included alerts from US-CERT that detailed the cyber actors and methods and 
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recommended mitigations in the event of future malicious activity. NCCIC declared that 
DHS and the FBI knew of the cyber actors and their activities since 2009, but no public 
action had been taken until the effects of the Sony cyber attack [37].  
The Commercial Facilities sector-specific plan references the cyber attack against 
Sony as evidence of increased cyber risks to the sector. Following a series of cyber attacks 
by North Korean malicious cyber actors, US-CERT published guidance on the threats, 
malware analysis, and mitigations [72]. The US-CERT guidance is a holistic report on the 
cyber threat posed by North Korea and concludes that North Korea is capable of cyber 
attacks against critical infrastructure.  
US-CERT-provided guidance also details communication flow between private 
entities and the federal government for response actions and cybersecurity efforts. Private 
sector entities are encouraged to contact the FBI when indicators associated with North 
Korean cyber actors are discovered, and the FBI has mechanisms for directly contacting 
private sector partners following indications of a potential cyber threat. Per the sector-
specific plan, those private sector partners that have established relationships with the FBI 
and DHS are able to receive more direct intelligence on the cyber threats. For example, the 
plan details points of contact and partnership structure for accessing the communications 
channels referenced in the US-CERT guidance. Additionally, U.S. Cyber Command may 
share foreign threat information with the FBI to aid in investigations of cyber attacks 
against private sector entities. Information from U.S. Cyber Command and the private 
sector flows into the same FBI operations center to facilitate efficiency of information 
sharing and response actions.  
Per the NIPP, risk management enhances security and resilience. Though 
prevention is an important component of security as defined in the NIPP, it is only one 
aspect of a much broader effort. In this instance, other risk management elements proved 
more important than prevention, and these proved effective in response to the North Korean 
cyber attack. Collaborative effort and coordination were touted as key to the success of 
federal efforts to identify, characterize, and mitigate North Korean cyber attacks. The FBI 
press release states that Sony notified authorities of the attack within hours and continued 
to be a valuable partner over the course of the incident response and the investigation that 
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followed. US-CERT notes the collaboration of the Department of State, DHS, and the 
Treasury Department in issuing the advisory to alert public and private sectors of the threats 
posed by North Korean cyber actors. Further, the malware analysis and technical advisories 
were conducted by CISA, FBI, the Treasury, and U.S. Cyber Command, demonstrating 
effective unity of effort as required by PPD-21.  
The PPD-21 directed tasks were well executed in response to this incident. For 
instance, the DHS management of response actions and DOD information sharing with 
DHS cyber centers were effective and well orchestrated. Resilience of critical 
infrastructure was likely strengthened by Sony’s partnership with the FBI during the 
incident, providing a positive example of private sector entities voluntarily engaging with 
the public sector to manage incidents, a key aspect of PPD-21, the NIPP, and sector-
specific plans. The partnerships described in the sector-specific plans were utilized in 
response actions. Information sharing of specific threats and mitigations continued from 
the date of the attacks to present. Finally, these events clearly indicate the importance of 
the private sector in securing critical infrastructure. In particular, increased security in 
response to threats is dependent upon information sharing among government entities and 
private sector partners. 
B. RUSSIAN INTRUSION INTO U.S. POWER COMPANIES  
On March 15, 2018, an alert was released through US-CERT on “Russian 
Government Cyber Activity Targeting Energy and Other Critical Infrastructure Sectors”  
[45]. Within the alert it is stated,  
DHS and FBI characterize this activity as a multi-stage intrusion campaign 
by Russian government cyber actors who targeted small commercial 
facilities’ networks where they staged malware, conducted spear phishing, 
and gained remote access into energy sector networks. After obtaining 
access, the Russian government cyber actors conducted network 
reconnaissance, moved laterally, and collected information pertaining to 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS). [45] 
The activity by Russian government cyber actors listed above had been ongoing 
since at least March 2016. The beginning time frame of the activity is significant, because 
cyber attacks against the Ukraine power grid disrupted electrical power for limited periods 
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of time in December 2015 and December 2016 [46]. The attacks against the Ukraine power 
grid, publicly attributed to Russian state-sponsored cyber actors, indicated that the same 
cyber actors conducting activity against the U.S. power grid had the capability to launch a 
similar attack against the U.S. Despite the observed capability, there is no evidence of 
Russian intent to disrupt power supply in the U.S. A press release by the American Public 
Power Association, a representative of power utilities and member of the Energy Sector 
SCC, stated that public and private sector officials agreed that there were not operational 
impacts caused by the malicious cyber activity [73].  
US-CERT noted that Russian cyber activity crossed several sectors of critical 
infrastructure [45]. The malicious cyber activity centered around business networks of 
plants categorized as being within the Energy, Commercial Facilities, and Critical 
Manufacturing Sectors, among others. After gaining access to business networks, the cyber 
actors would pivot into systems that received data from or contained information on the 
plant’s ICS and SCADA systems. The alerts from US-CERT were the result of 
collaboration between DHS and FBI and their work with infrastructure owners and 
operators. DHS and the FBI recommended that network administrators review and apply 
mitigations published in the alerts and technical reports.    
In March 2018, the same month the US-CERT alert was released, the DoE released 
the Multiyear Program Plan for Energy Sector Cybersecurity [74]. The plan states that the 
DoE established a dedicated office to lead cybersecurity efforts across the Energy Sector 
in alignment with DoE’s sector-specific agency roles and responsibilities. The goals 
outlined in the plan are strengthened cybersecurity, coordinated incident response, and 
accelerated research and development. These goals align with sector-specific agency goals 
described in the sector-specific plan. Related to the sector-specific plan, the cybersecurity 
plan expounds on the cyber threats and financial impacts of cyber crime to the Energy 
Sector in comparison to other critical infrastructure sectors. The development of a 
dedicated DoE office to promote cybersecurity is the notable accomplishment presented in 
the plan.  
In November 2017, The Energy Sector held the fourth iteration of a semiannual 
exercise on response and recovery to physical and cyber threats [75]. The goal of the 
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exercise was to minimize effects of emergency power disruptions and identify weaknesses 
in coordination efforts across the sector. A noted measure of success in the exercise was 
the increased participation. The coordination channels used during the exercise were the 
same as those described in the sector-specific plan, such as using the sector’s ISAC for 
technical assistance. The exercise and sector-specific plan place emphasis on the sector’s 
resilience in the face of major power disruptions.  
The more recent cybersecurity plan developed by DoE reinforces the reliance on 
private sector participation to strengthen sector security and resilience. The plan also shifts 
focus towards the prevention of cyber incidents, as opposed to recovery operations in the 
event of power disruption. The plan’s focus on preventing cyber incidents is likely needed 
to promote security across the sector, following the Russian malicious cyber activity.    
C. IRANIAN DISTRIBUTED DENIAL OF SERVICE ATTACKS AGAINST 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS  
Operation Ababil, as it was named by the perpetrators, was a series of denial of 
service cyber attacks against U.S. financial institutions in late 2012 [50]. The attacks were 
conducted by Iranian cyber actors, most likely sponsored by the Iranian government. The 
attacks lasted for months, beginning one week after physical protests and attacks against 
U.S. embassies, consulates, and diplomatic outposts in locations such as Yemen, Tunisia, 
and Libya. U.S. cybersecurity firm Recorded Futures noted that the protests may have been 
used as cover by the cyber actors to portray the attacks as hacktivism rather than as Iranian 
state-sponsored acts as U.S. government officials asserted [76]. 
According to analysis by various cybersecurity firms, the cyber attacks against U.S. 
financial institutions were part of a broader campaign that involved minor, sporadic attacks 
beginning in 2011 and culminated in a series of more significant, coordinated distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attacks against small and large financial institutions, to include 
the New York Stock Exchange and J.P Morgan Chase [77]. These cyber attacks affected 
at least 46 major financial institutions over at least 176 days and may have resulted in the 
loss of tens of millions of dollars in revenue [76]. As a result of the attacks, a U.S. grand 
jury brought charges against several Iranian cyber actors [78].  
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The sector-specific plan specifies that cyber attacks, like the ones carried out by 
Iranian cyber actors, highlight the need for partnership structures described in the NIPP 
and coordination with DHS, law enforcement agencies, the NCCIC, the sector’s ISAC, and 
others. The plan also stresses the need for rapid information sharing and continued 
utilization of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework. The required partnerships, the NCCIC, 
and the ISAC existed prior to the sector-specific plan, though some organizations have 
subsequently changed names. Prescribed utilization of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework 
[12] and the establishment of the Financial Services Sector Cyber Intelligence Group are 
notable changes to the status quo described in the plan. 
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework is a standardized approach to cybersecurity 
and the Cyber Intelligence Group is a Financial Services Sector information sharing center. 
Standardized cybersecurity practices and more efficient information sharing likely enhance 
critical infrastructure security, however it is unlikely either implementation of the 
framework or establishment of the Cyber Intelligence Group would have prevented the 
Iranian cyber attack. Rather, it is likely that the impact of the cyber attacks could have been 
reduced and that the duration could have been shortened.      
D. CHINESE EXFILTRATION OF DATA  
In 2014, a grand jury indicted five Chinese cyber actors for cyber attacks against 
various U.S. industries [79]. The indictment followed the publication of a report by the 
cybersecurity firm Mandiant detailing the activities of an advanced persistent threat 
referred to in the report as APT-1 [80]. While it is important to note that the indictments 
were a result of U.S. government intelligence and law enforcement operations, the report 
does provide independent corroboration of the government’s assertions. In particular, the 
report asserts that APT-1 was directly associated with a unit of the People’s Liberation 
Army. Further, the report characterized the activity as an extensive state-sponsored cyber 
operation against the U.S. private sector.  
The extent of cyber attacks by China against the U.S. was not limited to a specific 
period nor was it directed against a single segment of U.S. infrastructure. Rather, more 
recent activity attributed to state-sponsored Chinese actors, such as a cyber attack against 
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a U.S. Navy contractor in 2018, has also been observed [81]. This particular attack involved 
the exfiltration of over 600 gigabytes of sensitive information related to undersea warfare. 
A more general assessment of Chinese state-sponsored cyber operations against the U.S. 
was disseminated in the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community, provided by the Director of National Intelligence in 2018 [82]. The report 
detailed the following activity by China:  
China will continue to use cyber espionage and bolster cyber attack 
capabilities to support national security priorities. The IC and private-sector 
security experts continue to identify ongoing cyber activity from China, 
although at volumes significantly lower than before the bilateral US-China 
cyber commitments of September 2015. Most detected Chinese cyber 
operations against U.S. private industry are focused on cleared defense 
contractors or IT and communications firms whose products and services 
support government and private sector networks worldwide. China since 
2015 has been advancing its cyber attack capabilities by integrating its 
military cyber attack and espionage resources in the Strategic Support 
Force, which it established in 2015. [82]  
The campaign of malicious cyber activity by Chinese cyber actors detailed in the 
Mandiant report and elsewhere addresses a threat to U.S. industry but does not directly 
reference critical infrastructure. Nevertheless, it clearly impacts multiple sectors. PPD-21 
directs DOD and the intelligence community to contribute to the NCIJTF in order to 
provide threat intelligence to DHS. DOD’s Cyber Strategy expands on the limited role 
directed in PPD-21. Per the strategy, DOD focuses on foreign threats, then works with 
other federal departments to defend the critical infrastructure to which the threat applies. 
DOD defense efforts are focused on providing indications and warning to DHS and other 
federal agencies and on stopping cyber attacks at a potential point of origin on foreign 
adversarial networks or intermediate networks through which the attacks are conducted. 
DOD provides cyber threat information to the DHS-led NCIJTF who is then in a position 
to share it with sector-specific agencies and other federal cyber centers. The sector-specific 
categorization of critical infrastructure does not inhibit the security and resilience of critical 
infrastructure from threats and attacks that span multiple sectors, such as the case of 
Chinese cyber actors that threaten U.S. industries. 
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E. SUMMARY 
In each described cyber attack, the three lines of effort prescribed in PPD-41 were 
effectively executed. Threat response was carried out by DoJ and the FBI, and specific 
actors were identified and named in each case. Asset response was performed by CISA and 
resulted in the development and promulgation of mitigations, often through US-CERT 
alerts. Finally, intelligence and support activities, the third line of effort, were effectively 
conducted and information was disseminated to stakeholders as required. U.S. Cyber 
Command assistance in malware analysis in support of attribution efforts following the 
cyber attack against Sony provides one example. 
The criteria each sector is assessed by in Chapter III can be reasonably determined 
to characterize the readiness of the sector-specific agencies and address a cyber attack. 
Before the attack against Sony, for instance, the Commercial Facilities Sector Cyber 
Working Group promoted the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, identified critical 
cybersecurity functions and services in accordance with Executive Order 13636, and 
worked with sector partners and subject matter experts to set cyber risk priorities [16]. That 
the assessment that the Commercial Facilities Sector was evaluated as adequately 
organized to implement cybersecurity measures does not imply that a targeted attack by a 
nation-state adversary will not occur or that it will not have effects. Rather, it assessed the 
readiness of the sector to respond to the cyber incidents to minimize their effects. 
In the case of Russian infiltration into the Energy Sector, the institutional 
knowledge of DoE continues to enhance security of the sector, though it did not stop the 
infiltration. DoE and sector partners appropriately qualified the threat, noting there was no 
operational impact. DoE continues to refine sector cybersecurity practices through its 
cybersecurity plan and ongoing exercises that focus on security in addition to resiliency. 
Evidently, there is continuity of efforts by DoE to enhance sector security, in the face of 
an advanced threat. 
In the case of the Financial Services cyber attacks by Iranian cyber actors, the 
sector-specific plan implemented security measures based on lessons learned from the 
attacks. It is reasonably expected that the Cyber Intelligence Group, as an information 
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sharing center, can reduce both the duration and number of institutions affected by similar 
cyber attacks in the future. Again, while it is unlikely a targeted attack of this sort by an 
advanced adversary can be altogether prevented, effective execution of the sector-specific 
plan can significantly improve the response. 
The sector-specific plans describe continuing efforts within the sectors to enhance 
information sharing and response actions, and it is likely that those efforts will also reduce 
the negative effects of future cyber attacks. Broad implementation of the Cybersecurity 
Framework, timely dissemination of mitigations, and rapid response can also be reasonably 
expected to reduce the duration of an attack, its overall effectiveness, and its spread across 
infrastructure. Cyber attacks that threaten national security, such as the prolific data 
exfiltration campaign by Chinese cyber actors, are not necessarily confined to a single 
category of critical infrastructure or may extend beyond what is considered critical 
infrastructure. Though the sector-based approach to protecting critical infrastructure is 
adequate, the more recent addition of a functions-based risk management approach 
described in Chapter II enhances cybersecurity of critical infrastructure across sector 
boundaries. For example, U.S. Cyber Command conducts operations in support of 
prioritized efforts to defend elections and election infrastructure [83]. This example 
represents prioritized cybersecurity efforts, based on the NRMC functions-based approach. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The PPD-21 prescribed sector-based approach to critical infrastructure constrains 
the cybersecurity efforts. This thesis utilized three criteria derived from PPD-21 to assess 
the sector-based approach:  expertise or a notable advantage of the sector-specific agency; 
promotion of cybersecurity measures by the partnership structure; and legislation, policy, 
or sector-specific characteristics that enhance security and resilience of the sector. 
Supporting policy and organizational structures present the basis for the assessment. Cyber 
attacks against critical infrastructure are described and demonstrate limitations of the 
sector-based approach. 
Chapter I introduces national policy that directs the government to strengthen the 
security and resilience of critical infrastructure. The national policy defines the sector-
based approach to critical infrastructure and directs the federal effort to protect critical 
infrastructure and respond to cyber incidents. Importantly, national policy assigns primary 
responsibility for critical infrastructure security to DHS and supporting roles and 
responsibilities to additional federal departments and agencies. 
As it relates to critical infrastructure security, Chapter II examines the assigned 
tasks of national policy, the DHS organization, and the National Infrastructure Protection 
Plan. The NIPP standardizes the sector-based approach by defining partnership structures, 
establishing a risk management process, and promoting the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework. The public-private partnership structure supports the national unity of effort 
directed by PPD-21. The NIST Cybersecurity Framework was developed for broad use and 
implementation across critical infrastructure. The CISA and the NRMC are components of 
DHS responsible for critical infrastructure protection.  
Chapter III assesses each sector of critical infrastructure, compares sector-specific 
agencies, and examines sector-specific legislation. There are noted strengths and 
deficiencies in sectors. Several sectors are assessed as well organized to implement 
cybersecurity measures, though several are assessed as inadequately organized.  
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Chapter IV demonstrates limitations of the sector-based approach through 
examination of cyber attacks against critical infrastructure. Though, organizational 
structures and incident responses are assessed to reasonably reduce effects of cyber attacks, 
nation-state adversaries are capable of successful, targeted attacks against critical 
infrastructure.  
National policy directs the protection of critical infrastructure against cyber threats.  
Executive Order 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity, states the 
following:  
The cyber threat to critical infrastructure continues to grow and represents 
one of the most serious national security challenges we must confront. The 
national and economic security of the United States depends on the reliable 
functioning of the Nation’s critical infrastructure in the face of such threats. 
It is the policy of the United States to enhance the security and resilience of 
the Nation’s critical infrastructure and to maintain a cyber environment that 
encourages efficiency, innovation, and economic prosperity while 
promoting safety, security, business confidentiality, privacy, and civil 
liberties. We can achieve these goals through a partnership with the owners 
and operators of critical infrastructure to improve cybersecurity 
information sharing and collaboratively develop and implement risk-
based standards. [13] 
Public and private sector partnerships are well defined in the NIPP and adequately 
organized by the sector-based approach to critical infrastructure security. In accordance 
with Executive Order 13636, the NIST Cybersecurity Framework is promoted across 
public and private sector by the partnership structure. In some instances, public and private 
collaboration led to development of tailored versions of the Cybersecurity Framework, 
based upon sector-specific characteristics. These tailored versions of the Cybersecurity 
Framework are examples of the partnership structure’s effectiveness in implementing 
cybersecurity measures in support of the sector-based approach. 
This thesis assesses the sector-based approach as adequately structured to 
implement cybersecurity measures and defend critical infrastructure from cyber threats. 
Initially, the scope and scale of critical infrastructure indicated an untenable challenge to 
implementation of cybersecurity measures across critical infrastructure. Public-private 
partnerships and the federal roles and responsibilities support national policy that directs 
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strengthening of critical infrastructure security and resilience. The scope and scale of 
critical infrastructure is inconsequential to security efforts. The sector-based approach 
supports broad implementation of cybersecurity measures. 
For continual evaluation of government’s effectiveness in protecting critical 
infrastructure, additional study of the intersection of the functions-based risk management 
approach by the NRMC and the sector-specific approach will complement the assessments 
in Chapter III. There are indications of a positive intersection between the two, as 
evidenced by the efforts of government to protect U.S. elections. National Critical 
Functions may answer the question posed by ADM Rogers (ret.) about reconsidering the 
sector-based approach to critical infrastructure. Furthermore, focused analysis of any 
critical infrastructure sector’s cybersecurity efforts may determine sector-specific 
limitations or strengths to the sector-specific approach.  
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